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Constitutional Aspects of Physician-Assisted Suicide After Lee v. Oregon
Abstract

On November 8, 1994, Oregon voters narrowly passed the highly controversial Death with Dignity Act
(Measure 16), which marked the first time that physician-assisted suicide was explicitly legalized anywhere in
the world. In Lee v. Oregon, a group of physicians, several terminally ill persons, a residential care facility, and
individual operators of residential care facilities sought to enjoin enforcement of the new law, claiming various
constitutional infirmities. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon enjoined enforcement of the law,
acknowledging that it raised important constitutional issues including possible violations of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This note analyzes the impact of the Lee
and the debate surrounding physician assisted suicide. Part II of this Note outlines several important ethical
and legal arguments both in favor of, and opposed to, legalized assisted suicide. Part III discusses the cases that
have reviewed laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. Part IV examines Measure 16 in detail, including a
review of the safeguards drafted into the act. This Note continues with a discussion of the constitutional
questions presented in Lee v. Oregon as traditionally analyzed and as treated by the court. This Note
concludes that one may not properly infer a fundamental right to assisted suicide. In addition, the Equal
Protection Clause does not prevent states from recognizing a patient's right to remove life-sustaining
treatment and hydration, while prohibiting doctors from prescribing lethal medication to the terminally ill on
request.
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Dying is personal.
many, the thought
thought of an
an
personal. And it is profound.
profound. For
For many,
ignoble end,
quiet, proud
death,
ignoble
end, steeped in decay,
decay, is abhorrent.
abhorrent. A quiet,
proud death,
intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.
consequence.
bodily integrity
integrity intact,
-Justice William Brennan
Brennan'1
-Justice

I.

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Two recent circuit court decisions have reinvigorated
reinvigorated the debate over the
constitutional, practical and ethical ramifications
physician-assisted suicide.2
suicide. 2 In
constitutional,
ramifications of physician-assisted
Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
Washington, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
Compassion
death. 3 The court
choosing the time and manner of one's death.3
liberty interest exists in choosing
found this right to outweigh all asserted state interests, and concluded
concluded that, with
respect to competent, terminally ill adults, Washington's prohibition of assisted
assisted
suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 44 The ruling
effectively
effectively strikes down laws against assisted suicide in all of the states in the Ninth
5
Circuit. 5
In April 1996, in Quill
Quill v. Vacco, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
New York's prohibition of assisted suicide violates the U.S. Constitution's
Constitution's Equal

t B.A., 1992, Hamilton College; J.D. candidate, 1997, Boston
Boston University School of Law. The
The
author would
remarkably supportive family, and
would like to thank the incredible
incredible AJLM
AJLM staff, his remarkably
Jeff, Courtney, and Brooks.
wonderful friends, especially
especially Molly, Lindsay, Jeremy,
Jeremy, Josh, Ashley,
Ashley, Jeff,
Special thanks to Trey Anastasio
Anastasio and David Wilcox for keeping me in tune.
II Cruzan
Cruzan v.
v. Director,
497 U.S.
U.S. 261,
261, 310-11
310-11 (1990)
(Brennan, J.,
Director, Missouri
Missouri Dep't
Dep't of
of Health,
Health, 497
(1990) (Brennan,
J.,
dissenting).
For purposes
purposes of
of this
Note, physician-assisted
"occurs when
facilitates aa
22 For
this Note,
physician-assisted suicide
suicide "occurs
when aa physician
physician facilitates
enable the patient
patient's death
death by providing the necessary means and/or information
information to enable
patient to perform
the life-ending
act." Council
on Ethical
Judicial Affairs,
Ass'n, Decisions
Decisions Near
the
life-ending act."
Council on
Ethical &
& Judicial
Affairs, American
American Med.
Med. Ass'n,
Near
the End of Life, 267 JAMA
2229 (1992)
(1992) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Decisions].
JAMA 2229,
2229,2229
Decisions).
3 79 F.3d
F.3d 790,
816 (9th
(9th Cir.),
Cir.), cert.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37
379
790, 816
cert. granted
granted sub nom. Washington
(1996).
(1996).
See id.
1.
44 See
id. at
at 838; see also U.S. CONST.
CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
The Ninth
Ninth Circuit
includes the
following states
states and
and territories:
55 The
Circuit includes
the following
territories: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Guam, Hawaii,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.
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The court
court found that the law treated
treated similarly
similarly situated
situated groups
groups
Protection Clause.
Clause. 66 The
Protection
dissimilarly
by
allowing
the
withdrawal
of life-sustaining
life-sustaining treatment
treatment even
even if
if that
withdrawal of
dissimilarly by allowing
would result
result in death,
death, but
but preventing
preventing physicians
physicians from prescribing
prescribing lethal
lethal medication
medication
terminally ill people
people at their
their request.
request.17 The
The U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court
Court agreed
agreed to
to
to other terminally
review
review both
\>oth decisions,
decisions, and
and should
should issue
issue its
its ruling
ruling this summer.
summer.88
The
The U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court's review
review of Compassion
Compassion in Dying and Quill has shared
shared
Michigan prosecutors
the "assisted
"assisted suicide"
suicide" spotlight
spotlight of late. In Michigan
prosecutors continue
continue their
their
crusade against
against Dr. Jack Kevorkian,
Kevorkian, trying him unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully for violations
violations of state
state
crusade
In Oregon,
Oregon, residents
residents took a dramatic
dramatic step in the
the
provisions against assisted
assisted suicide. 99 In
provisions
opposite direction,
direction, voting to legalize physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide for competent,
competent,
opposite
terminally
terminally ill
ill people
people under
under certain
certain circumstances.'
circumstances. to0
November 8,
1994, Oregon
Oregon voters
voters narrowly
narrowly passed
passed the highly
highly controversial
controversial
On November
8, 1994,
(Measure 16), fifty-two to forty-eight percent.1lI' Although
Death
Although
Death with
with Dignity
Dignity Act (Measure
physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide
suicide has received substantial attention in
in recent
recent years,
years, passage
passage
the Oregon
Oregon Measure
Measure marked
marked the first time
time the
the practice
practice had been explicitly
explicitly
of the
world. 122 Measure
Measure 16,
physicians to prescribe
prescribe
legalized anywhere
anywhere in the world.'
16, which allows physicians
legalized
13
medication
of
dose
lethal
a
medication to terminally
terminally ill people
people under certain conditions,
conditions,13
physician-assisted suicide. Rather than grapple
temporarily shifted the debate over physician-assisted
grapple
temporarily
whether there exists
exists a "right
"right to die"
die" protected
protected by the U.S. Constitution,
Constitution, Measure
with whether
state-sanctioned
16
16 presented an opportunity
opportunity. to evaluate the novel concept
concept of state-sanctioned
Subsequently, a U.S. district court
assisted
assisted suicide. Subsequently,
court considered
considered traditional
traditional moral and
legal arguments
arguments both for and against physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide in the context of a
4
law allowing the practice.'
practice. 14
"request and obtain a prescription
Measure
Measure 16 authorizes
authorizes a qualified patient
patient to "request
manner."'s Proponents
to end his or her life in a humane and dignified
dignified manner."ls
Proponents of the law
hoped that it would grant competent, terminally
te~inally ill persons a way of ending their
their

also U.S.
cert. granted,
117 S.
S. Ct.
6680
80 F.3d
F.3d 716,
716, 727
727 (2d
(2d Cir.),
Cir.), cert.
granted, 117
Ct. 36
36 (1-996);
(1-996); see
see also
U.S. CONST.
CONST. amend.
amend.
I.
XIV, §§ 1.

Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
77 See Quill,
Glucksberg, 117
36 (1996)
(1996) (granting
cert.); Washington
Vacco v.
117 S.
S. Ct.
36, 36
88 See
See Vacco
v. Quill,
Quill, 117
Ct. 36,
(granting cert.);
Washington v.
v. Glucksberg,
117
S. Ct. 37,
S.
37, 37-38 (1996)
(1996) (granting cert.).
cert.).
Physician-AssistedSuicide:
Suicide: Whose Life Is it Anyway?, 47
99 See Catherine L. Bjorck, Comment, PhysiCian-Assisted
SMU L. REV. 371,379-82
(1994).
.
371, 379-82 (1994).
16) (codified
'0
to See Death
Death with Dignity Act, 1995 Or. Laws
Laws ch. 3 (Initiative Measure No. 16)
(codified at
at
Measure 16].
(1995)) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Measure
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995
127.800-995 (1995»
Assisted-Death Bill,
Bill, Hous.
HOUS.
Voters Open
Open Can
Can of
Worms with
with Assisted-Death
see also
Caplan, Oregon
Oregon Voters
11
Id.; see
Illd.;
also Art
Art Caplan,
of Worms
10, 1994,
1994, at 3.
3.
CHRON., Dec. 10,
Court?, AM.
AM. MED.
MED.
Showdown Headed
to High
Suicide Showdown
M. Gianelli,
Gianelli, Assisted
Assisted Suicide
12 See
See Diane
12
Diane M.
Headed to
High Court?,
suicide are tolerated in the Netherlands,
1995, at I,
1, I.
1. Both euthanasia and assisted suicide
NEWS,
21, 1995,
NEWS, Aug. 21,
Other Medical
Medical
al., Euthanasia
Euthanasia and
and Other
though not explicitly legal. See Paul J. van der Maas et aI.,
Territory of
The Northern Territory
the End
End of Life, 338 LANCET 669, 669 (1991).
Concerning the
Decisions Concerning
(1991). The
of
Decisions
See, e.g., David C.
physician-assisted suicide. See,
Australia recently legalized euthanasia and physician-assisted
Death of Their
Patients: Ethics
Ethics and
Choose to
to Participate
in the Death
Thomasma, When Physicians
Physicians Choose
Participate in
Their Patients:
& ETHICS 183,
183, 188 (1996). However,
Suicide, 24 J.L. MED. &
Physician-AssistedSuicide,
Physician-Assisted
However, on March 24, 1997,
Repeals Euthanasia
Euthanasia
Australia Repeals
the Australian Senate voted to overturn the law. See Alan Thornhill, Australia
25, 1997, at A14. Four people committed suicide with assistance while the
WASH. POST, Mar. 25,1997,
Law, WASH.
See id.
id.
law was in effect. See
(1995).
13 See
See OR.
OR. REV.
REV. STAT.
STAT. §§ 127.800
127.800 (1995).
13
(D. Or.
Or. 1995).
1995).
v. Oregon,
Oregon, 891
891 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 1491,
1491, 1493
1493 (D.
14 See
See Lee
Lee v.
14
15 OR.
OR. REV.
REV. STAT. ch. 127.800
127.800 §§ 1.01(7).
1.01(7).
IS
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lives with dignity, free from suffering.l
suffering. 166 The measure
measure sought to achieve
achieve these goals
goals
doctors from punishment under the criminal statute outlawing assisted
assisted
by exempting
exempting doctors
suicide. I?
suicide.17
In Lee v. Oregon,
Oregon, a group of physicians,
physicians, several terminally ill persons, a
operators of residential care facilities sought
residential
residential care facility, and individual
individual operators
various constitutional
constitutional infirmities.
to enjoin enforcement
enforcement of the new law, claiming various
infirmities.'ls8
The plaintiffs
"terminally ill"
ill" .
plaintiffs initially claimed that Measure 16's classification
classification of the "terminally
did not rationally relate to a legitimate
legitimate state interest, and thus violated the Equal
Protection Clause.'
Clause. 199 The plaintiffs also argued that Measure
Measure 16 deprived
deprived depressed,
20
ill
terminally
terminally people of their right to live, in violation of the Due Process
Process Clause. 2o
enforcement of the
The U.S. District Court
Court for the District of Oregon enjoined enforcement
acknowledging that it raised important constitutional issues including possible
law, acknowledging
possible
violations of the Equal Protection
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2211 At a hearing
hearing on the merits, the court found that Measure
Measure 16 violated
violated
22
The court
the Equal Protection Clause, but it failed to reach the due process issue. 22
"Measure 16 withholds from terminally ill citizens
held that "Measure
citizens the same protections
protections
from suicide the majority enjoys,"
enjoys," but suggested that, with certain
certain modifications, the
23
act could pass constitutional muster. 23
Compassion in Dying decision, unless reversed on appeal to the
Although the Compassion
24
U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court,
Court,24
effectively grants terminally ill patients in Oregon the right to
effectively
25
a physician's
physician's assistance
assistance in hastening
hastening their deaths,
deaths,25
a detailed
detailed discussion of Lee v.
Oregon
legalizing
Oregon remains vital. Other circuits
circuits may face challenges to laws legalizing
26
physician-assisted suicide, and must therefore understand Lee.
physician-assisted
Lee.26
Part II of this Note outlines several important ethical and legal arguments both
in favor of,
of, and opposed to, legalized
legalized assisted suicide. Part III discusses
discusses the cases
that have reviewed
reviewed laws prohibiting
prohibiting physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide. Part
Part IV examines
Measure 16 in detail, including a review of the safeguards
safeguards drafted into the act. This
Measure
presented in Lee v.
Note continues
continues with a discussion of the constitutional
constitutional questions presented
Oregon
Oregon as traditionally
traditionally analyzed and as treated by the court.

16 Cf
Cf. Charles
Charles H.
H. Baron
Baron et
al., A
A Model
Model State
State Act
Act to
and Regulate
Physician-Assisted
et aI.,
16
to Authorize
Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 33 HARV. J.
J. ON
ON LEGIS.
LEGIS. I,
1, 4 (1996)
(1996) (arguing
(arguing that "it
"it is reasonable to provide relief from
Suicide,
suffering for patients who are dying or whose suffering is so severe that it is beyond their capacity to
bear").
17 See
See OR.
OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 163.125
163.125 (providing
(providing that
"[ciriminal homicide
constitutes manslaughter
manslaughter
17
REV. STAT.
that "[c]riminal
homicide constitutes
in the second degree when ...
. . . [a]
[al person intentionally causes or aids another person to commit
commit
suicide").
18
See Lee
869 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 1491,
1491, 1493
IS See
Lee v.
v. Oregon,
Oregon, 869
1493 (D. Or. 1994).
1994).
19
19 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431.
1431.
20
See Lee,
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1497.
1497.
20 See
Lee, 869
869 F.
21
See
id.
21 See id.
22
See Lee,
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1437.
22 See
Lee, 891
891 F.
1437.
Id.
23 [d.
24 The
The Court
Court heard
heard oral
arguments on
on January
January 8,
8, 1997,
is expected
expected to
to issue
24
oral arguments
1997, and
and is
issue aa ruling
rul ing by
by midmidSanctity of Life and of Death,
TIMES,
summer. See Linda Greenhouse, Before the Court,
Court, the Sanctity
Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5,
5, 1997, §§ 4, at 4.
4.
25 See
See Compassion
v. Washington,
Washington, 79
79 F.3d
791, 838
838 (9th
(9th Cir.
Cir. 1996).
1996).
25
Compassion in
in Dying
Dying v.
F.3d 791,
26 On
On February
February 27,
1997, the
the Ninth
Ninth Circuit
Circuit effectively
the district
district court's
court's ruling
in Lee
26
27,1997,
effectively reversed
reversed the
ruling in
Lee
v. Oregon.
Oregon. See
See Lee
Lee v.
v. Oregon,
Feb. 27,
27, 1997)
1997) The
court held
the
v.
Oregon, 1997
1997 WL 80783 (9th
(9th Cir.
Cir. Feb.
The court
held that
that the
id. at *6
plaintiffs who challenged Measure 16 lacked standing. See id.
*6 (finding that "[n]one
"[n]one of the
... violations").
Plaintiffs can assert an 'injury
'injury in fact' resulting from the alleged ...
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This Note
Note concludes
concludes that
that one
one may
may not
not properly
properly infer
infer aa fundamental
fundamental right
right to
to
This
assisted suicide.
suicide. In
In addition,
addition, the
the Equal
Equal Protection
Protection Clause
Clause does
does not
not prevent
prevent states
states
assisted
from recognizing
recognizing aa patient's
patient's right
right to
to remove
remove life-sustaining
life-sustaining treatment
treatment and
and hydration,
hydration,
from
ill on
on
while prohibiting
prohibiting doctors
doctors from
from prescribing
prescribing lethal
lethal medication
medication to
to the
the terminally
terminally ill
while
request. However,
However, this
this Note
Note also
also concludes
concludes that
that under
under relevant
relevant U.S.
U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court
Court
request.
cases, the court
court in Lee
Lee v. Oregon
Oregon erred
erred by ruling
ruling that
that Measure
Measure 16 violated
violated equal
equal
cases,
16 rationally
rationally relates
relates to
to a
protection. Because
Because the
the classification
classification drawn
drawn in
in Measure
Measure 16
protection.
legitimate state
state interest, there
there can
can be no
no violation
violation of
of the
the Equal
Equal Protection
Protection Clause. If
If
legitimate
the courts
courts eventually
eventually strike
strike down
down Measure
Measure 16,
16, this
this Note
Note recommends
recommends that
that sponsors
sponsors
the
reintroduce a modified
modified version
version of
of the law
law that satisfies
satisfies the
the Lee
Lee court's
court's concerns.
concerns.
reintroduce
Because the
the court
court based its judgment
judgment in part
part on
on the classification's
classification's perceived
perceived
Because
27
overinclusiveness,27
that aa new act
act with tighter
tighter distinctions
distinctions would
would pass
pass
it follows that
overinclusiveness,
equal
equal protection
protection analysis.
analysis.
II.
II.

ASSISTED SUICIDE
SUICIDE
ASSISTED

Both suicide generally,
generally, and
and physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide specifically,
specifically, have
have
Both
28
rigorous historical
historical scrutiny.
scrutiny.28 The constitutional
constitutional issues this
this Note
withstood rigorous
addresses reflect significant
significant moral, ethical, theological
theological and practical
practical concerns.
concerns.
addresses
A.

TRADITIONAL
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS

The primary
primary arguments in support of legalized physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide derive
derive
29
from familiar themes of dignity
dignity and personal
personal autonomy.
autonomy.29
Technology
Technology which has
extended the average life-span
life-span has also brought forth images
images of incapacitation,
incapacitation,
extended
30
Most Americans
Americans believe
believe that terminally
terminally ill patients
helplessness and suffering. 30
helplessness
3) The
should be allowed to end their lives before they die of natural causes. 31
The
American Medical Association, while rejecting
rejecting physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide, noted that
American
'the
physicians "demonstrate
acknowledge 'the
"demonstrate respect for human dignity when [they] acknowledge
physicians
32
freedom [of individuals] to make choices in accordance
accordance with their own values."'
values."'32
freedom
presents a
Despite objecting to suicide generally, many feel that assisted suicide presents
reasonable alternative to living with the perceived indignity and pain of terminal
33
illness)3
illness.
Closely related to the idea that we should live and die with dignity is the
celebrated concept of personal autonomy. As a popular notion, personal
personal autonomy
autonomy
"it permits people to
implies a certain latitude of self-determination,
because "it
self-determination, valued because
1437.
Supp. at
at 1437.
Lee, 891
891 F.
F. Supp.
27 See
See Lee,
27
154
Perspectives, 154
Empiric Perspectives,
and Empiric
Ethical, and
Historical, Ethical,
Euthanasia: Historical,
J. Emanuel,
Emanuel, Euthanasia:
Ezekiel J.
28 See
See Ezekiel
28
(1994).
1890, 1890-92 (1994).
ARCH. INTERN.
INTERN. MED. 1890,
2, at
at 2229.
2229.
supra note
note 2,
Decisions,supra
29 See
See Decisions,
29
30 See
See id.
id.
30
of
that 64%
64% of
demonstrating that
research demonstrating
1898 (citing
(citing research
28, at
at 1898
supra note
note 28,
Emanuel, supra
see also
also Emanuel,
31 See
See id.;
id.; see
3)

to aa
injection to
lethal injection
administer aa lethal
to administer
be allowed to
the American public
public believes aa physician should be
ill patient).
terminally ill
TERMINATION
ON THE
THE TERMINATION
GUIDELINES ON
CTR., GUIDELINES
HASTINGS CTR.,
2230 (quoting
(quoting HASTINGS
note 2,
2, at
at 2230
supra note
32 Decisions,
Decisions,supra
32
(1987)).
THE DYING (1987».
OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
CARE OF THE
TREATMENT AND CARE
The Model
Model Penal
Penal Code,
Code, which
which categorizes
categorizes assisted
assisted suicide
suicide as
as aa second
second degree
degree felony,
felony, seems
seems
33 The
states that although itit
to section
section 201.5 states
to consider
factor. Commentary
Commentary to
as aa mitigating
mitigating factor.
consider suffering as
his
urging of his
yielded to the urging
husband yielded
"where aa husband
murder, "where
suicide as murder,
might
assisted suicide
to treat
treat assisted
be easier
easier to
might be
... to
to
mixed ...
too often mixed
motives are
are too
of self-destruction, motives
means of
provide her with the means
wife to
to provide
sick wife
incurably sick
incurably
1959).
No. 9, 1959).
cmt. I1 (Tentative Draft No.9,
201.5 cmt.
CODE §§ 201.5
PENAL CODE
compelling." MODEL PENAL
the case compelling."
make the
make
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form and
and live
live in
in accordance
accordance with
with their
their own
own conception
conception of
of aa good
good life,
life, at least
least within
within
form
34
Laws
the bounds
bounds of
of justice
justice and
and consistent
consistent with
with others
others doing
doing so
so as
as well."
well."34
Laws
the
about
choices
important
prohibiting
assisted
suicide
curtail
the
freedom
make
important
choices
about
make
to
freedom
the
curtail
suicide
prohibiting assisted
35
one's life.
life. 35
one's
B.
B.

TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENTS AGAINST
AGAINST PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
PHYSICIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE
SUICIDE
TRADITIONAL

Those who
who oppose
oppose legalized
legalized assisted
assisted suicide
suicide in
in any
any form
form often
often rely
rely on
on moral,
moral,
Those
religious and
and historical
historical imperatives.
imperatives. Laws
Laws against
against suicide,
suicide, although
although no
no longer
longer in
religious
force in
in the United
United States,
States, prevailed
prevailed in
in English
English common
common law
law until
until 1961.36
1961.36 English
English
force
law "perceived
"perceived suicide
suicide as
as an immoral,
immoral, criminal
criminal offense
offense against
against God
God and also against
against
law
37
The United
the King,
King, who
who as a result thereof
thereof was
was deprived
deprived of one
one of his
his subjects."
subjects."37
United
the
38
although
mid-nineteenth century,
century,38
although aa large
large
rejected laws
laws against suicide
suicide in the mid-nineteenth
States rejected
39
majority of
of states continue
continue to criminalize
criminalize aiding and abetting
abetting suicide.
suicide.39
majority
continue to
to prohibit
prohibit assisted
assisted suicide
suicide to
to protect
protect the
the sanctity
sanctity of human
human
States continue
4o In
In principle,
principle, "the
"the interests
interests in
in the sanctity
sanctity of life that are
are represented
represented by
by
life.40
criminal homicide
homicide laws
laws are threatened
threatened by
by one who expresses a willingness
willingness to
criminal
participate in taking the life of another,
another, even though
though the act
act may be accomplished
accomplished
participate
objections
victim." 41 These objections
the consent,
consent, or at the
the request, of the
the suicide
suicide victim."41
with the
42
probably originated in religious doctrine.
doctrine. 42
probably
Some have
have argued that
that legalizing
legalizing assisted
assisted suicide will make
make suicide aa rational
Some
reasonable alternative
alternative to life. One commentator
presented the worst-case
worst-case
commentator presented
or reasonable
scenario:
In a suicide-permissive
suicide-permissive society
society plagued by shortages
shortages of various kinds
and a growing
growing population
population of 'nonproductive'
'nonproductive' people, how likely is it
and
old or ill person will be encouraged
encouraged to spare both herself and
that an old
her family the agony of a slow decline, even though she would not
own? 43
have considered suicide on her own?43

34 Dan W. Brock,
Euthanasia, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992,
Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia,
1992, at 10,
10,
11.

35 But see Emanuel,
Emanuel, supra
supra note 28, at 1894-95
1894-95 (noting that opponents of assisted suicide
suicide
to
"death irreversibly alienates autonomy and cannot be condoned by appeal to
believe that "death
autonomy").
36 See Leslie L. Mangini, Note,
Note, To Help
Help or
or Not to Help:
Help: Assisted Suicide and
and its
its Moral,
Moral,
36
(1994).
Ethical, and Legal
SETON HALL LEGIS.
LEGIS. J. 728, 733 (1994).
Legal Ramifications,
Ramifications, 18 SETON
Ethical,
Id. at 732.
37 ld.
is no
no
"there is
because "there
disappeared because
probably disappeared
suicide probably
and attempted
attempted suicide
suicide and
against suicide
38 Prohibitions
Prohibitions against
38
punishment
... criminal punishment
form of criminal punishment that is acceptable for aa completed suicide and ...
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 201.5 cmt. 22
is singularly inefficacious to deter attempts to
suicide." MODEL
to commit suicide."
(Proposed Official Draft
Draft 1962).
39 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT.
STAT. §§ 163.117 (1993);
(1993); see
see also
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5
201.5 cmt.
cmt. 1I
39
P.
cf. Antonius P.
be prohibited); cf
suicide should be
(Tentative
No. 9, 1959) (concluding that assisted suicide
(Tentative Draft No.9,
(1993).
L. REV. 793,
793, 795-96 (1993).
N.U. L.
20 OHIO
OHIO N.U.
Suicide, 20
Legal Assisted
Assisted Suicide,
Against Legal
The Case
Case Against
Tsarouhas,
Tsarouhas, The
40 See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., MODEL
MODEL PENAL CODE
CODE §§ 210.5 cmt. 5 (Proposed
(Proposed Official Draft 1962); cf
cf
40
of
1996) (acknowledging the State of
Compassion in
(9th Cir. 1996)
79 F.3d
F.3d 790, 817 (9th
v. Washington, 79
in Dying
Dying v.
preserving life).
interest in
in preserving
unqualified interest
Washington's unqualified
1962).
Official Draft
Draft 1962).
(Proposed Official
cmt. 55 (Proposed
CODE §§ 210.5
210.5 cmt.
PENAL CODE
41 MODEL
MODEL PENAL
41
193-97.
notes 193-97.
accompanying notes
infra text
text accompanying
see also
also infra
36, at
at 731-32;
731-32; see
note 36,
supranote
42 See
See Mangini,
Mangini, supra
42
43 Yale
Yale Kamisar,
Kamisar, Are Laws
Laws Against
Against Assisted
Assisted Suicide
Suicide Unconstitutional?,
Unconstitutional?,HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
REP.,
43
(2d ed. 1995)
1995)
245 (2d
IN AMERICA 245
HENDIN,
see also
also HERBERT HEN
at 32,
32, 39;
39; see
1993, at
May-June 1993,
DIN, SUICIDE IN
selflove, so
so the selfof love,
to be affirmations
affirmations of
out to
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perceive legalization of
of assisted
assisted suicide
suicide as
as the top
top of a slippery
slippery slope
slope that
Critics perceive
that
44
life.44
human life.
devalue human
ultimately devalue
would ultimately
The slippery
slippery slope
slope theory has been
been refuted in
in part by experience
experience in
The
in the
45
Netherlands, where euthanasia is accepted,
accepted, though not
not legal.
legal.45
Dutch authorities
authorities will
Dutch
Netherlands,
prosecute as long as three conditions are
are met:
met:
not prosecute
First, the
the patient must take the initiative in requesting euthanasia
euthanasia and
First,
freely. Second,
has to request euthanasia repeatedly, consciously, and freely.
must be experiencing suffering that cannot be
be relieved by
by
the patient must
except death. Third, the physician must consult with
with
any means except
another physician who agrees that
that euthanasia isis acceptable in the
another
46
case. 46
particular case.
suicide
In the Netherlands, itit appears that when requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide
have been fulfilled, those requests were explicit and persistent, and rarely made
othiers. 47
from otliers.47
under pressure from
against physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide relates to
to the
One of the primary attacks against
"healer." 48 To become a physician, prospective doctors
doctor's perceived role as a "healer."48
must
take the
Hippocratic Oath, which states, in relevant part, "I
"I will give no deadly
must take
the Hippocratic
medicine
counsel." 49 Many believe that a
medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel."49
physician
healer cannot reconcile
reconcile assisting in the death of a
physician dedicated to her role as a healer
50
patient. 50 Yet doctors themselves generally support physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide in
sacrificial
suicide may lend itself to becoming
aged
sacrificial suicide
becoming the instrument of tyranny of the healthy over the aged
and
Nancy J.
Suicide and
and Older
Older People-A Deadly
Combination: Ethical
and infirm");
infirm"); Nancy
J. Osgood,
Osgood, Assisted
Assisted Suicide
Deadly Combination:
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Problems in
in Permitting
Problems
Permitting Assisted Suicide,
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MED. 415,
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sanctioning assisted
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ANNAS,
ANNAS, The Insane
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Prisoner: The Supreme Court
Court and the Right to Die, in
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STANDARD
OF CARE:
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THE LAW
LAW OF
OF AMERICAN
AMERICAN BIOETHIcs
BIOETHICS 85,
(adapted from George
George J.
Annas,
of Nancy
& HEALTH CARE
Annas, The
The Long
Long Dying
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"problem with the 'right to life' position is that it is exclusively a slippery-slope argument that
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the current
current rights
rights of
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speculative harms that may
may be
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e.g., Leon
Leon R.
Right to
to Die?,
44 See,
See, e.g.,
R. Kass,
Kass, Is
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There aa Right
Die?, HASTINGS
HASTINGS CTR.
CTR. REP.,
REP., Jan.-Feb.
Jan.-Feb. 1993,
1993, at
at
34,
37-38; see
34,37-38;
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also Compassion
Compassion in Dying
Dying v. Washington,
Washington, 79 F.3d 816,
816, 830
830 (9th
(9th Cir. 1996)
1996) (noting
(noting
that
that critics
critics of
of the
the practice
practice believe
believe recognizing
recognizing physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide will
will eventually
eventually lead to
"court-sanctioned killing"
people deemed
deemed to pose
pose an "unjustifiable
"unjustifiable burden
burden on society").
"court-sanctioned
killing" of people
45
at 1896; see
45 See
See HENDIN,
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note 43,
43, at
at 250-77;
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Emanuel, supra
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note 28,
28, at
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et al.,
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supra note
note 12,
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Maas et
that
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be most
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reluctant to do so again"
again" and
and that they would
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"in the
the face
face of
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unbearable suffering
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with no
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46
46 Emanuel,
Emanuel, supra
supra note
note 28,
28, at
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1896.
47
47 See
See van
van der
der Maas
Maas et
et al.,
aI., supra
supra note
note 12,
12, at
at 672.
672. Interviews
Interviews with physicians
physicians who
who had practiced
practiced
euthanasia
96% of
of the
the cases,
cases, their
their patients
patients had explicitly
explicitly and
and persistently
persistently requested
requested
euthanasia showed
showed that
that in 96%
assistance.
See id.
id. In
In 94%,
94%, the
the patients
patients had
had made
made the
the request
request repeatedly.
repeatedly. See id.
id. In
In addition,
addition, 99%
99%
assistance. See
of
of physicians
physicians reported
reported that they
they felt
felt sure the
the requests
requests had
had not
not been
been made
made under
under pressure
pressure from others.
others.
See
See id.
id.
48
48 See
See Emanuel,
Emanuel, supra
supra note
note 28,
28, at
at 1891-92.
1891-92.
49
49 HIPPOCRATES,
HIPPOCRATES, HIPPOCRATIC
HIPPOCRATIC WRITINGS
WRITINGS xiii
xiii (Francis
(Francis Adams
Adams trans.,
trans., Encyclopedia
Encyclopedia Britannica,
Britannica,
Inc.
Inc. 1952).
1952).
50 The American Medical Association (AMA) refuses to support physician-assisted suicide or
50 The American Medical Association (AM A) refuses to support physician-assisted suicide or
active
active voluntary
voluntary euthanasia,
euthanasia, on
on the
the grounds
grounds that
that they
they are
are "contrary
"contrary to
to the
the prohibition
prohibition against
against using
using
the
the tools
tools of
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medicine to
to cause
cause aa patient's
patient's death."
death." Decisions,
Decisions, supra note
note 2,
2, at
at 2233.
2233. Some,
Some, however,
however,
envision
envision aa substantially
substantially broader
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role for
for doctors
doctors near
near the
the end
end of
of their
their patients'
patients' lives.
lives. See,
See, e.g.,
e.g.,
TIMOTHY
TIMOTHY E.
E. QUILL,
QUILL, AA MIDWIFE
MIDWIFE THROUGH
THROUGH THE
THE DYING
DYING PROCESS
PROCESS 1-5
1-5 (1996).
(1996).
When
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51 Dr. Timothy Quill, for example,
some cases.51
example, has used specific "sympathetic"
"sympathetic" cases
to argue that a doctor's responsibility to relieve suffering encompasses
encompasses prescribing a
52
lethal dose of medication
commentators question the
medication if necessary.
necessary.52
However, some commentators
suicide.5533
legalization
proposing
those
of
motives
legalization of assisted suicide.
Critics argue that our society has moved toward accepting physician-assisted
physician-assisted
suicide primarily because it has failed to respond
respond adequately to the needs of the
elderly, terminally
terminally ill population.5544 They contend that given universal health
coverage, and better, more accessible hospice care, for example,
coverage,
example, people
people would
would
55
. In this view, assisted suicide is a "quick-fix"
"quick-fix" that establishes
establishes a
choose to live. 55
56
dangerous precedent. 56
is no clear direction when a patient is dying. Yet, healing has more to do with caring
caring
for the person
'life.. .. .. .. Medicine's
Medicine's
person who is ill than with simply extending biological ·life
purpose
purpose should
should include helping persons become
become more whole and alleviating
alleviating their
suffering,
suffering, as well as treating their diseases....
diseases .... Such is the role of a medical healer.

Id. at 1.
i.
Id.
"double effect" standard.
approve of the "double
standard. See Decisions,
Decisions, supra
supra note
The AMA does, however, approve
2, at 2229,
2233. If a physician
2229, 2233.
physician prescribes
prescribes medication primarily to relieve a patient's pain and
and
suffering, then she is performing
performing a proper medical
medical function although she knows the patient
patient will die
because
also Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 828
because of her actions. See id.; see also
n.102 (9th Cir. 1996).
physicianControversy surrounds this principle.
principle. George Annas argues that laws legalizing physicianassisted suicide are unnecessary,
unnecessary, because physicians
physicians can currently prescribe
prescribe lethal medications as
as
long as they have
patients." George
George J. Annas,
Annas, Death
Death by
have "a legitimate medical use to terminally ill patients."
Prescription: The Oregon
Oregon Initiative,
Initiative, 331 NEW
1240, 1242 (1994).
Prescription:
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1240,
(1994). In response,
response, Dr.
process become
become more open.
open. See Timothy
Timothy E. Quill, The Oregon Death
Death with
Quill has urged that the process
Dignity Act, 332
(1995). He notes that the double effect
332 NEW
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174,
1174, 1175
1175 (1995).
effect would
Dignity
exonerate physicians
exonerate
physicians who knew their patients wanted
wanted to die, as long as the physicians
physicians intended
intended that
id. "Such
"Such laws and ethical
the prescribed medication
medication be used to ease pain, not to cause death.
death. See id.
pseudoconversations
involving
distinctions reinforce
reinforce pseudo
conversations that are dangerous for patients and doctors, involving
deception
essential." Id.
Id.
deception and unclear thinking at a time when
when honesty
honesty and openness are essential."
51
recent survey
found that
66% of
responding Oregon-based
felt physician51 A
A recent
survey found
that 66%
of responding
Oregon-based physicians
physicians felt
physicianal., Legalizing
assisted suicide would be ethical in some cases. See Melinda A. Lee et aI.,
Legalizing Assisted
Oregon, 334 NEw
(1996). A separate
Suicide-Views of Physicians
Physicians in Oregon,
NEW ENG. J. MED. 310, 311 (1996).
separate study
study
of physicians
physicians in Michigan found that fewer than 20%
20% favored a complete
complete ban on assisted suicide.
al., Attitudes of Michigan
and the Public
Public Toward
Toward Legalizing
See Jerald
Jerald G. Bachman et aI.,
Michigan Physicians
Physicians and
Physician-AssistedSuicide
Suicide and
and Voluntary Euthanasia,
Euthanasia,334 NEw
(1996).
Physician-Assisted
NEW ENG. J.J. MED. 303,
303, 305 (1996).
52
Timothy E.
E. Quill,
and Dignity:
Dignity: AA Case
Case of
of Individualized
52 See
See Timothy
Quill, Death
Death and
Individualized Decision
Decision Making,
Making, 324
324
(1991). But see Annas, supra
supra note 50,
50, at 1243 (arguing
(arguing that "'ideal'
NEW ENG. J.
J. MED. 691 (1991).
'''ideal' cases,
like that described
described by Quill, are an insufficient basis for changing public policy in a country
country where
medicine
practiced in the context of bias and social inequality").
inequality"). Dr. Quill has
medicine continues to be practiced
fought to overturn
See, e.g.,
overturn laws prohibiting
prohibiting physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide on constitutional
constitutional grounds. See.
infra Part III.C.
1996); see also discussion infra
Quill v. Vacco,
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 1996);
III.C.
53
Kass, supra
supra note
at 3377 (categorizing
(categorizing supporters
supporters of the "right to die" as
53 See,
See. e.g.,
e.g., Kass,
note 44,
44, ·at
"[c]hildren
administrators and health
"[
c ]hildren looking at parents who are not dying fast enough,
enough, hospital administrators
economists concerned
economists
concerned about cost-cutting
cost-cutting and waste,
waste, [and] doctors disgusted with caring
caring for
incurables").
incurables").
54
e.g., Emanuel,
supra note
28, at
1895. These
at 1895.
These concerns
54 See,
See. e.g.,
E~anuel, supra
note 28,
concerns stem in part from statistics
demonstrating
HENDIN, supra
demonstrating that the suicide rate in the United
United States rises with age. See HENDlN,
supra note 43,
at 81.
population,
81. "Persons
"Persons over the age of 50, while making up 26 percent of the total United States population,
account
approximately 39 percent
account for approximately
percent of the total deaths by suicide
suicide each year."
year." Id.
Id.
55
Cf William
William G.
Bartholome, Physician-Assisted
Physician-AssistedSuicide,
Hospice, and Rituals
Rituals of Withdrawal,
Withdrawal,
55 Cj
G. Bartholome,
Suicide. Hospice.
24 J.L. MED. &
& ETHICS
ETHICs 233,
(1996) (arguing
(arguing for increased
233. 233-34 (1996)
increased use of hospice
hospice care instead
instead of
of
suicide
suicide or assisted suicide).
suicide).
56
However, the
the contention
contention that
in aa world
world with
with ideal
treatment options
suffering people
56 However,
that in
ideal treatment
options most
most suffering
people
would choose to live,
live, does not lead invariably
invariably to the rejection
rejection of physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide.
Presumably
of
Presumably such a world would include some who would choose to die even after considering
considering all of
their options. Cj
Cf.QUILL, supra
supra note 50,
physicians for assisted
50, at 4 ("The notion that all requests to physicians
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III. DO
DO LAWS
LAWS PROHIBITING
PROHIBITING ASSISTED
ASSISTED SUICIDE
SUICIDE IN
IN ALL
ALL CIRCUMSTANCES
CIRCUMSTANCES
III.
VIOLATE
VIOLATE THE
THE U.S.
U.S. CONSTITUTION?
CONSTITUTION?
A.
A.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OFSOUTHEASTERN
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
PENNSYLVANIA V.
V. CASEY
CASEY 57
57
PLANNED

Reasonable grounds
grounds exist
exist on
on which a court
court could
could find that
that the right
right of
of privacy
privacy
Reasonable
extends to physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide.58
58 In Casey,
Casey, the
the U.S.
U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court
Court
extends
privacy, stating
stating that
that matters
matters
acknowledged a constitutional
constitutional right of privacy,
acknowledged
involving the most
most intimate
intimate and
and personal
personal choices
choices a person may make
make in
involving
a lifetime,
lifetime, choices
choices central
central to personal dignity
dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty
liberty protected
protected by the
the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
of
liberty is
is the right
right to define one's
one's own
own concept
concept of existence,
existence, of
of
liberty
meaning, of the
the universe,
universe, and
and of the mystery
mystery of
of human life.
life. Beliefs
meaning,
about these matters
matters could not define
define the attributes
attributes of personhood
personhood were
about
59
they formed under compulsion
compulsion of the state.59
would dispute that death ranks
ranks among the most mysterious
mysterious concepts
concepts that human
Few would
beings confront. Terminally
TerminaUy ill patients
patients confront death while most others
others in society
brush it aside. Similarly,
Similarly, pregnant
pregnant women, by virtue of their condition,
condition, are uniquely
60
terminally ill
whether to terminate their pregnancies.
pregnancies. 60
Both terminaUy
situated to determine whether
patients and pregnant women
women must evaluate
evaluate their beliefs about
about existence and the
Casey suggests that a
human life, before acting. A broad
broad reading
reading of Casey
mystery of human
terminaUy
patient's intimate
intimate choice to receive a lethal dose of medication
medication should
terminally ill patient's
61
be protected
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Amendment. 61
"essential
One must note, of course,
course, that although
although Casey reaffirmed
reaffirmed the "essential
63
Under
substantially narrowed that decision. 63
holding" of
of Roe v. Wade,62
Under
Wade,62 it also substantially
Casey, only those state limitations
limitations that pose an "undue
"undue burden" on a protected
protected
Casey,
64
"has the
An unduly burdensome
interest will be found unconstitutional.
unconstitutional. 64
burdensome limitation "has
purpose or effect
effect of placing a substantial
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
woman seeking an
65
"undue burden"
abortion."65
Still, it remains
remains unclear how courts should apply the "undue
abortion."

stem from undertreated
character flaw is an
depression, or some kind of character
undertreated pain, unrecognized depression,
death stem
comfort
Emanuel, supra
supra note 28, at 1895 (arguing that even though
though adequate
adequate comfort
illusion."). But cf Emanuel,
[euthanasia]1should be
"this does not mean [euthanasia
would not prevent great pain and suffering in some cases, "this
legalized
well-being of patients
patients in general").
general"). By prohibiting
prohibiting
legalized under the guise
guise of promoting the well-being
assisted
cases, society might "protect"
"protect" those who would
would ideally
ideally prefer life, and work to
assisted suicide in all cases,
end-of-life treatment
improve end-of-Iife
treatment options. However, this would reject the decisions of persons who
autonomy they would have
would choose death regardless of their options, denying them the autonomy
"perfect" world.
enjoyed in the more "perfect"
57 505
505 U.S.
U.S. 833 (1992).
(1992).
the
Cir. 1996)
1996) (noting
790, 813-14
813-14 (9th
(9th Cir.
79 F.3d
Dying v.
Washington, 79
Compassion in
58 See
See Compassion
58
in Dying
v. Washington,
F.3d 790,
(noting the
between a decision to have an abortion and a decision about how and when to die);
similarities between
similarities
Option, a
in Dying: AA Humane
Physician Aid in
& David J. Burman, PhysiCian
Humane Option,
Kathryn L. Tucker &
(1995) (arguing that no sound
Choice, 18
18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 495,
Constitutionally
495, 500 (1995)
ProtectedChoice,
ConstitutionallyProtected
Casey).
protection defined by Casey).
basis exists for excluding physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide from the scope of protection
59 Casey,
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
851.
59
at 850-52.
850-52.
60 See
See id.
id. at
60
note 58,
58, at
at 500.
500.
supra note
See, e.g.,
e.g., Tucker
Tucker &
61 See,
61
& Burman,
Burman, supra
62
See
Casey,
505
U.S.
at
845-46,
aff'g
Roe
v.
Wade,
(1973).
62 See Casey, 505 U.S. at
aff'g
v.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
id. at
at 877-79.
877-79.
63 See
See id.
63
877-78.
64 See
See id.
id. at
at 877-78.
64
Id. at
at 877.
877.
65 Id.
65
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66
standard outside of the abortion context. 66
Yet, assuming
assuming the existence of a liberty
physician-assisted suicide, one could hardly argue that
that a law
interest in choosing physician-assisted
assisted suicide
suicide in all
all circumstances does not constitute
constitute an undue burden on
banning assisted
67
exercise. 67
its exercise.
constitutionally protected liberty interest
interest in
in
The argument in favor of a constitutionally
physician-assisted suicide suffers because the purported
physician-assisted
purported right falls outside
68
The Court suggested that it
boundaries of the privacy right delineated by case law. 68
would hesitate to broaden the scope of the privacy interest beyond matters involving
"marriage, procreation,
procreation, contraception,
contraception, family
family relationships,
"marriage,
relationships, child rearing, and
69
education."
education."69
The abortion cases and related decisions "are not intended to lead
subjects. '70
automatically to the recognition of other fundamental rights on different subjects."70
Casey demonstrate the U.S. Supreme Court's reluctance to
Recent decisions such as Casey
expand the right of privacy beyond its current scope.

B.

71
OFHEALTH
V. DIRECTOR,
DIRECTOR, MissouRI
CRUZAN v.
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH 71

of
Although the right of privacy may not include
include assisted
assisted suicide,
suicide, a second line of
cases offers a more realistic
Cruzan v. Director,
realistic possibility for its protection.
protection. In Cruzan
Director,
Missouri Department
Health, the U.S. Supreme
Missouri
Department of Health,
Supreme Court considered
considered whether the
parents of a woman who suffered an accident
accident and had lost all cognitive abilities
72
could withdraw life-sustaining
The Missouri Supreme Court had ruled
ruled
life-sustaining treatment. 72
of tubes providing her with
that Nancy Cruzan's parents could not order the removal oftubes
evidence that she would have
food and hydration without clear and convincing
convincing evidence
73
situation. 73
wanted to die in such aa situation.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
standard. 744 Although
Supreme Court upheld the Missouri standard.7
at first glance this result might have discouraged
discouraged proponents of a constitutional
constitutional right
to die, the decision
eventually had the opposite effect. 75
decision eventually
75 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
competent person
writing for the Court, noted
noted that
that the "principle
"principle that a competent
person has a
constitutionally
constitutionally protected
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
treatment

66 See
Brownstein, How
Infringed: The
Undue Burden
66
See Alan
Alan Brownstein,
How Rights
Rights Are
Are Infringed:
The Role
Role of
of Undue
Burden Analysis
Analysis in
in
Constitutional
Doctrine,
45
HASTINGs
L.J.
867,
954
(1994)
("Inconsistencies
and
uncertainty
in the
Constitutional Doctrine,
HASTINGS L.J. 867,954 (1994) ("Inconsistencies
the
application
unavoidable because there is no common foundation
application of the
the undue
undue burden standard
standard are
are unavoidable
underlying
underlying the various rights that the Constitution
Constitution protects.").
protects. ").
67
Compassion in
F.3d 790,
(9th Cir.
Cir. 1996)
67 See
See Compassion
in Dying
Dying v.
v. Washington,
Washington, 79
79 F.3d
790, 832,
832, 834-35
834-35 (9th
1996)
(describing
of Washington's
Washington's prohibition
prohibition of assisted
assisted suicide
suicide on the liberty
liberty interest
interest of
of
(describing the
the effect
effect of
terminally
terminally ill people
people in choosing
choosing the time and manner
manner of their deaths).
deaths).
68
68 See
See Casey,
Casey, 505
505 U.S.
U.S. at
at 851.
851.
69
Id. In
69Id.
In Quill
Quill v.
v. Koppell,
Koppell, the
the District
District Court
Court for
for the
the Southern
Southern District
District of
of New
New York
York rejected
rejected the
the
petitioners'
claims
that
New
York's
prohibition
assisted suicide
suicide was contrary
contrary to the
the holdings
holdings of
of
petitioners' claims
prohibition of assisted
Roe and Casey.
1994), rev'd sub
Casey. Quill v.
v. Koppell,
Koppell, 870 F. Supp.
Supp. 78,
78, 83
83 (S.D.N.Y.
(S.D.N.Y. 1994),
sub nom. Quill v.
v.
Vacco,
these cases
cases isis too
too
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716
716 (2d
(2d Cir.
Cir. 1996). The court
court stated
stated that the plaintiffs'
plaintiffs' "reading
"reading of these
broad."
Quill, 870
870 F. Supp.
Supp. at 83.
83. But see Eisenstadt
Eisenstadt v. Baird,
Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
438, 453 (1972)
(1972) (noting
(noting
broad." Quill,
that
individual ...
... to be
if "the
"the right
right of privacy
privacy means
means anything,
anything, itit is the right of the
the individual
be free from
from
that if
unwarranted
... fundamentally
fundamentally affecting
affecting a person").
person").
unwarranted governmental
governmental intrusion
intrusion into
into matters ...
70 Quill,
Quill, 870
870 F.
F. Supp. at 83.
83.
71
71 497
497 U.S.
U.S. 261
261 (1990).
(1990).
72
72 See
See id.
id. at
at 265.
265.
73
73 See
See Cruzan
Cruzan v.
v. Harmon,
Harmon, 760
760 S.W.2d
S.W.2d 408,
408, 425
425 (Mo.
(Mo. 1988).
1988).
74
74 See
See Cruzan,
Cruzan, 497
497 U.S.
U.S. at
at 280.
280.
75
75 See
See Kass,
Kass, supra
supra note
note 44,
44, at 40.
40.
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76
Perhaps,
may be inferred
inferred from our prior
prior decisions."
decisions."76
Perhaps, then,
then, a "constitutional
"constitutional right
right to
may
die with assistance
assistance may
may be inferred
inferred from the
the Supreme
Supreme Court's
Court's recognition
recognition of a
die
constitutional right
right to
to refuse
refuse medical
medical treatment,
treatment, just as
as recognition
recognition of
of that
that right
right was
constitutional
77
inferred from prior
prior Court
Court holdings."
holdings."77
inferred
difficult yet
yet critical
critical question
question is whether
whether the Court's assumption
assumption in Cruzan
A difficult
the U.S. Constitution
Constitution "would
"would grant a competent
competent person
person a constitutionally
constitutionally
that the
78
protected right to refuse
refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition,"
nutrition,"78
includes taking
taking active
active
includes
lifesaving hydration
protected
steps to commit suicide. Many
Many have argued that there is no significant
significant difference
difference
steps
between a competent
competent person
person exercising
exercising the right to refuse
refuse treatment, knowing that
between
such inaction
inaction will result in death,
death, and a physician
physician supplying
supplying a competent
competent person
person with
such
lethal dose
dose of medication.
medication. 79
79 In
In both cases, a competent
competent adult makes
makes a decision that
a lethal
achieving that
eventually will lead
lead to death. Yet
Yet a physician's
physician's assistance in achieving
that death
death
eventually
of a reach for the U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court.
may pose too far of
may
The Court would
would likely
likely distinguish
distinguish between
between active and
and passive
passive steps,
steps, and hold
hold
The
that. physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide is not protected.
protected. Courts
Courts and legislatures
legislatures do not
not
that.
generally consider withdrawal
withdrawal of life-sustaining
life-sustaining treatment
treatment suicide.88o0 In fact, the right
right
withdraw life-sustaining
hydration developed
developed from a historic right
right
life-sustaining treatment and hydration
to withdraw
81 Because obtaining a prescription
prescription for lethal
obtaining
to refuse treatment of any kind. 81
refusal of treatment, the
the Court would likely remove
medication
medication from a doctor is not a refusal
physician-assisted suicide
suicide from the reach of Cruzan.
Cruzan. The
The Court would
would
the case for physician-assisted
ending life from an omission which has the same
same
likely distinguish the act of ending
82
effect.82
effect.
Justice Scalia
Scalia has criticized
criticized the active-passive
active-passive distinction. "It would not make
Justice
oneself by
by walking into the sea, but may
may sit
much sense to say that one may not kill oneself
submerged by the incoming
incoming tide .
....
Some commentators
-83 Some
. . "83
on the beach until submerged
hydration and
agreed that no logical distinction
distinction exists between
between withdrawal
withdrawal of hydration
have agreed

278.
U.S. at
at 278.
76 Cruzan,
76
Cruzan, 497
497 U.S.
note 9,
9, at
at 390.
77
Bjorck, supra
77 Bjorck,
supra note
390.
279.
U.S.
at
497
78
Cruzan,
78 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
79
supra note 58, at 502-04 (contending
79 See, e.g.,
e.g., Tucker & Burman,
Burman, supra
(contending that the liberty interest in
treatment cannot be distinguished from choosing to hasten inevitable
refusing unwanted medical treatment
1996)
also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1996)
death with active medical assistance); see also
(finding one category of persons encompassing all those "in
"in the final stages of fatal illness [who]
1995)
Washington, 49 F.3d
F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1995)
wish to hasten their deaths"); Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
"Constitutional distinction cannot be drawn between refusing
(Wright, J., dissenting) (stating that aa "Constitutional
life-sustaining medical treatment and accepting physician assistance in hastening death"). But see
95-1858)
1996 WL 656345 (No. 95-1858)
*7, Vacco v. Quill, 1996
U.S. Supreme Court Petitioner's Brief at ·7,
(arguing that the right to forgo treatment "derives
and
"derives from the common law right to bodily integrity and
'right' to physician-assisted
freedom from unwanted physical intrusions [whereas the] asserted 'right'
suicide is ...
...a right to demand outside assistance in the taking of one's own life").
life").
between
"a real
distinction between
(noting "a
(N.J. 1976)
1976) (noting
647, 665
665 (N.J.
Quinlan, 355
e.g., In
In re
80 See,
See, e.g.,
80
re Quinlan,
355 A.2d
A.2d 647,
real distinction
. . . in the
the self-infliction of deadly harm and aa self-determination against artificial life support ...
face of irreversible, painful and certain imminent death").
at 90.
90.
81 See
See ANNAS,
81
ANNAS, supra
supra note
note 43,
43, at
ed. 1995).
1995).
460 (2d
(2d ed.
RIGHT TO
DIE 460
THE RIGHT
ALAN MEISEL,
MEISEL, THE
82 See
See 22 ALAN
82
TO DIE
infer that
may easily
easily infer
One may
J.,
concurring).
(Scalia,
261,
266
(1990)
497
U.S.
83
Cruzan,
83 Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). One
that Justice
Justice
He
concurring opinion. He
assisted suicide from this concurring
Scalia opposes aa constitutionally protected right to assisted
Scalia
requiring an
ought not to be exceeded in requiring
humane limits that ought
questioned, are there "reasonable and humane
but they are not set forth in the Due
There obviously are, but
his own
own life? There
individual to preserve his
Clause." Id.
Id. at 300.
Process Clause."
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physician-assisted
suicide.8844 Based on its opinion in Cruzan,
physician-assisted suicide.
Cruzan, however, it appears
8s First, the Court merely assumed,
likely that the Court will make such a distinction.85
but did not hold, that competent
competent persons have a constitutionally
constitutionally protected
protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.8866 If the Court either proceeds with the
assumption, or actually holds that such a right exists, then it would have to
same assumption,
determine whether there is a constitutionally
determine
constitutionally significant difference
difference between
between
physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide and forgoing life-sustaining treatment.
The Court
suggested
suggested its willingness
willingness to distinguish these categories when it implied that statutes
in
prohibiting assisted suicide are constitutional.
constitutional.8877 In support of the state's interest in
preserving life, Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist wrote that "the majority
majority of States in this
country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another
another to commit
commit
suicide. We do not think a State is required
required to remain
remain neutral in the face of an
death."88
to death."88
starve to
informed
informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult
adult to
to starve
the Court would find no constitutional
constitutional infirmity in a
This statement suggests that the·
state's ban of assisted suicide, and must, therefore, signal the existence
existence of a line
line
between
between a patient's right to refuse unwanted treatment
treatment and that patient's request for a
89
lethal prescription. 89
C.

QUILL
QUILL v.
V. VAcca
VA CCO 90
90
In Quill
Quill v. Vacco,
Vacco, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered
considered

the claim that New York's prohibition of assisted suicide violated both the Due
Process
Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 9911 The
opinion, 92 held that with respect to competent,
court, reversing
reversing a brief district court opinion,92
terminally ill persons
persons who request drugs from physicians to hasten their deaths,
deaths, the
93
law violated the Equal Protection Clause. 93
The court affirmed the district court's rejection
rejection of the plaintiffs'
plaintiffs' claim that the
right to assisted
suicide
is
a
fundamental
liberty
under
the
substantive
component of
assisted suicide
component
of
94
94
the Due Process Clause. The court concluded
concluded that such a right could not properly
84
Kass, supra
44, at
Tucker &
& Burman,
supra note
note 58,
58, at
at 503-04;
also
84 See
See Kass,
supra note
note 44,
at 41;
41; Tucker
Burman, supra
503-04; see
see a/so
MEISEL,
supra
note
82,
at
460
(arguing
that
"'forgoings'
of
life-sustaining
treatment
can
MEISEL, supra
(arguing
'''forgoings'
life-sustaining treatment can be
be
accomplished either by withholding or by withdrawing,
withdrawing, and withdrawing-for
withdrawing-for instance, the turning
accomplished
act than a self-inflicted
off of a ventilator-is
ventilator-is no less of an act
self-inflicted shooting, poisoning,
poisoning, wrist slitting,
hanging,
hanging, or even overdose of prescribed medication").
85 But
But see
see Quill
Quill v.
Vacco, 80
F.3d 716,
729 (2d
Cir. 1996)
1996) (assuming
(assuming that
85
v. Vacco,
80 F.3d
716, 729
(2d Cir.
that persons
persons authorized
authorized
life-sustaining treatment are similarly situated with terminally ill persons
by statute to withdraw life-sustaining
persons who
wish to take a lethal dose of medication).
medication).
86 See
See Cruzan,
Cruzan, 497
497 U.S.
U.S. at
at 279.
279. But
But see
v. Vacco,
Vacco, 80
80 F.3d
716, 737
86
see Quill
Quill v.
F.3d 716,
737 (2d
(2d Cir.
Cir. 1996)
1996)
(Calabresi,
Supreme Court "did
"did
J., concurring) (concluding that despite its use of the term, the U.S. Supreme
(Calabresi, J.,
not merely 'assume'
'assume' that a liberty
life-sustaining medical treatment
liberty interest in refusing
refusing life-sustaining
treatment existed").
existed").
87
Larson, Seeking
Seeking Compassion
The Washington
Law Against
Against
87 See
See Edward
Edward J.
J. Larson,
Compassion in
in Dying:
Dying: The
Washington State
State Law
Assisted Suicide,
Suicide, 18
(1995).
18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 509, 511-12 (1995).
88 Cruzan,
Cruzan, 497
497 U.S.
at 280.
88
U.S. at
280.
89 See
See Larson,
supra note
note 87,
512.
89
Larson, supra
87, at
at 512.
90 80
80 F.3d
F.3d 716
716 (2d
(2d Cir.
Cir. 1996).
1996).
91
See id.
at 718.
The Constitution
states, in
relevant part,
that "[n]o
"[n]o state
state shall
... deprive
deprive any
91 See
id. at
718. The
Constitution states,
in relevant
part, that
shall ...
any
person
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
person within its
person of life,
jurisdiction
jurisdiction the equal protection
protection of the laws."
laws." U.S. CONST.
CONST. amend. XIV,
XIV, § 1.
I.
92
See Quill
Quill v.
870 F.
F. Supp.
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
92 See
v. Koppell,
Koppell, 870
Supp. 78
78 (S.D.N.Y.
93
See Quill,
80 F.3d at 727.
93 See
Quill, 80
727.
94
id. at 723.
94 See id.
723.
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95
be included within the right of privacy.
privacy.9s
"and other related
related
The abortion cases, "and
procreation and child rearing, are not intended to lead automatically to
decisions on procreation
the recognition
subjects." 96 The court
recognition of other
other fundamental rights on different
different subjects."96
assumed that without support from these cases, the purported
purported right would only be
"fundamental" if it were "'deeply
deemed "fundamental"
'''deeply rooted in this nation's history and
and
97
tradition"'
or "so 'implicit
'implicit in the concept
tradition"'97
concept of ordered liberty'
liberty' that 'neither
'neither liberty
98
sacrificed.'"'98
nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.
produced
Because the plaintiffs produced
insufficient evidence on either count, the court concluded
concluded that the case did not
99
involve a fundamental right,
right,99
and therefore
therefore found no Due Process Clause
violation. 100
The Quill court
challenge to the law
court instead focused on the equal
equal protection challenge
law
banning
Amendment
banning assisted
assisted suicide. The Equal Protection Clause
Clause of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment
requires
individuals who are similarly
requires that states "treat in a similar manner
manner all individuals
situated."101 The plaintiffs based their argument
competent person
situated."lol
argument on the fact that a competent
102
has the right to withdraw life-sustaining
terminally
They claimed that terminally
life-sustaining treatment. 102

95 See id. at 724 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).
9S See id. at 724 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986».
96
Quill, 870
870 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 83.
83.
96 Quill,
97
Quill, 80
80 F.3d
723 (quoting
(quoting Moore
97 QUill,
F.3d at
at 723
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
494, 503 (1977)).
(1977».
98
Id.
(quoting
Palko
v.
Connecticut,
319, 325-26
98 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
302 U.S.
U.S. 319,
325-26 (1937)).
(1937».
99 See id.
id. at 724.
724. Contrary
Contrary to the court's suggestion, history does not conclusively scorn
suicide.
example, in 1789, David Hume wrote:
suicide. For example,
wrote:
ourselves, no
That suicide may often be consistent
consistent with interest and with our duty to ourselves,
no
one can question, who allows that age, sickness, or misfortune may render
render life a
burden, and make it worse
worse even than annihilation. I believe
believe that no man ever threw
threw
away life while it was worth keeping.
David
Suicide, in DAVID
ESSAYs 315,
(Stephen Copley
David Hume, An Essay on Suicide,
DAVID HUME: SELECTED
SELECTED ESSAYS
315, 323 (Stephen
Copley &
&
Andrew
1993).
Andrew Edgar eds., 1993).
100 See
80 F.3d
724-25. However,
However, because
oversimplified
because the
the court
100
See Quill,
Quill, 80
F.3d at
at 724-25.
court employed
employed oversimplified
analysis,
incorrectly
analysis, we cannot learn much from the due process discussion
discussion in Quill.
Quill. First, the court incorrectly
assumed that only a state's interference
interference with a fundamental
fundamental right may lead to a violation of the Due
Cf. Compassion in Dying
1996) (noting
Process Clause.
Clause. Cf
Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 803 (9th
(9th Cir. 1996)
that the Supreme
approach" has led it to speak
Supreme Court's
Court's "evolving
"evolving doctrinal approach"
speak of "substantive
"substantive due
process
Casey and
and
process interests"
interests" rather than "fundamental
"fundamental due process rights"
rights" in recent years). In both Casey
Cruzan,
example, the Court balanced
legitimate state
Cruzan, for example,
balanced nonfundamental
nonfundamental liberty interests against
against legitimate
interests. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
833, 837 (1992);
(1992);
Pennsylvania v.
v. Casey,
Casey, 505 U.S.
U.S. 833,
Cruzan
(1990). In Casey,
Casey, the joint
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
261, 278-79 (1990).
joint
opinion
"undue burden
opinion used a test whereby an "undue
burden exists, and therefore a provision
provision of law is invalid, if
if
its purpose
purpose or effect
effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path
path of a woman seeking an abortion
before
viability." Casey,
Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
before the fetus attains viability."
837.
The Court also overemphasized
overemphasized the importance
importance of historical sanction in judging whether
whether a
right is fundamental.
fundamental. In Casey,
Casey, the Court noted that making historical approval a prerequisite to
constitutional
constitutional protection would be
inconsistent
inconsistent with our law ....
.... Marriage is mentioned
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and
interracial
interracial marriage
marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th
19th century, but the Court was no
doubt correct
correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected
protected by the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause.
component
Casey,
1, 12 (1967».
(1967)).
Casey, 505 U.S.
U.S. at 847-48 (citing
(citing Loving
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12
101 Quill,
Quill, 80
80 F.3d
F.3d at
CONST. amend.
XIV, §§ I.
1. The
The court
court concluded
concluded that
people
101
at 725;
725; see
see U.S.
U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV,
that people
who could refuse lifesaving treatment
treatment and people who
who wished a physician's aid in suicide
suicide were
similarly
"competent
similarly situated. See Quill,
Quill, 80 F.3d at 729. These two groups together
together constituted "competent
persons
Id. at 727.
persons who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their deaths."
deaths." Id.
102
N.Y. PUB.
LAW §§
§§ 2960-79
2960-79 (McKinney
1993); Quill
v. Koppell,
F. Supp.
Supp.
102 See
See N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH
HEALTH LAW
(McKinney 1993);
Quill v.
Koppell, 870
870 F.
also Cruzan,
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. Life-sustaining
Life-sustaining treatment
78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see a/so
treatment includes
"mechanical
ventilation, renal
renal dialysis,
antibiotics, and
and artificial nutrition and
"mechanical ventilation,
dialysis, chemotherapy,
chemotherapy, antibiotics,
hydration."
hydration." Decisions,
Decisions, supra
supra note 2, at 2229.
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physicians' aid in hastening death were similarly situated, and
ill patients seeking physicians'
differently.103
that the state had no justification for treating them differently.103
States that treat similarly situated people differently subject
subject themselves to
04
various levels of judicial scrutiny.1
scrutiny.104
The court determined that rational basis review
05
was the appropriate standard in evaluating laws prohibiting assisted suicide.1
suicide. 0s
Like
other social welfare legislation, this law would pass judicial scrutiny if the
106
classification drawn rationally furthered a legitimate
classification
legitimate state purpose. 106
The court concluded
concluded that the distinction failed to pass even the low level of
of
07
scrutiny imposed by rational basis review.1107
The court held that "to the extent that
the statutes in question prohibit persons in the final stages of terminal illness from
self-administered, prescribed
having assistance in ending their lives by the use of self-administered,
drugs, the statutes lack any rational basis and are violative of the Equal Protection
Protection
08
Clause."
Clause."108
Quill are problematic. First, the court's basis for its
Certain aspects of Quill
conclusion that those who may remove life-sustaining treatment are similarly
district
situated to those who wish to obtain a lethal prescription
prescrip~ion was mistaken. The district
unreasonable or irrational for the State to
court ruled that "[i]n
"[i]n any event, it is hardly unreasonable
recognize a difference between
between allowing nature to take its course,
course, even in the most
intentionally using an artificial death-producing
device."1 09
severe situations, and intentionally
death-producing device."109
The Second
Second Circuit
Circuit criticized this view, reasoning that both situations
situations involve active
I1O
death."o
steps to hasten death.
By ordering the discontinuance
discontinuance of these
life-sustaining
these artificial
artificial life-sustaining
processes
or
refusing
to
accept
them
in
the
first
place,
a
patient
hastens
processes
place,
hastens
his death by means that are not natural in any sense. It certainly
certainly cannot
cannot
be said that the death that immediately
immediately ensues is the natural
of
natural result of
the progression
progression of the disease or condition
condition from which
which the
the patient
patient
suffers.
suffers. I'II II
legitimately view
One could, however, legitimately
view the withdrawal
withdrawal of life-sustaining
life-sustaining treatment as
"letting nature
"letting
nature take its course."
course." If no technology
technology existed to keep the patient alive,
respirator
then the disease already
already would have caused
caused that person's
person's death.
death. Adding a respirator
dying.12
can be seen as an artificial
artificial delay in the natural course
course of dying.
112
Even if the physical
physical act of "pulling the plug" is unnatural in some respects, it
of
differs significantly
significantly from obtaining
obtaining a doctor's
doctor's prescription
prescription for a lethal
lethal dose
dose of
including
medication. The U.S. Constitution
Constitution protects the right to refuse treatment, including
corresponding right exists to
cases where the refusal will result in death, but no corresponding

103
at 84.
103 See
See Quill,
Quill, 870
870 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. at
84.
104
104 See
See Quill,
Quill, 80
80 F.3d
F.3d at
at 725-27.
725-27.
105 See
726.
\05
See id.
id. at
at 726.
106
County Assessor,
106 See
See id.
id. (citing
(citing Hooper
Hooper v.
v. Bernalillo
Bernalillo County
Assessor, 472
472 U.S.
U.S. 612,
612, 618
618 (1985)).
(1985».
107 See
727.
107
See id.
id. at
at 727.
108 Id.
108/d.
109
84 (S.D.N.Y.
\09 Quill
Quill v.
v. Koppell,
Koppell, 870
870 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 78,
78,84
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
1994).
I1O See Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
110
729.
1II
Id.
I1IId.

112
112 The
The AMA
AMA apparently
apparently supports
supports this
this interpretation.
interpretation. See
See Decisions,
Decisions, supra
supra note
note 2,
2, at
at 2229.
2229. It
It
defines
defines treatment
treatment as
as "life-sustaining"
"life-sustaining" when
when itit "serves
"serves to prolong
prolong life without reversing
reversing the
underlying
Id.
underlying medical
medical condition."
condition." Id.
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"Americans have never
obtain "treatment"
"treatment" such as a lethal dose of medication.1lI3
"Americans
been
been obligated to accept
accept any or all manner of medical treatment available to prolong
life; the essence of the legal right at stake is the right to be free from unwanted
unwanted
' 14
invasions."
bodily invasions."114
life-sustaining treatment should not, therefore, be classified
classified
The withdrawal
withdrawal of life-sustaining
as suicide. Rather, death results from the disease which prompted medical
medical care
Physician-assisted suicide causes a person who would otherwise have lived
initially. Physician-assisted
without any medical attention
physician-assisted
attention to die. It is a form of suicide. As physician-assisted
life-sustaining treatment
treatment
suicide may properly be seen as suicide, and withdrawal
withdrawal of life-sustaining
may not, the court erred by finding them to be similarly situated.

D.
D.

15

WASHINGTON 1
V. WASHINGTON
COMPASSION IN DYING V.
115

In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the plaintiffs-four
plaintiffs-four physicians, three
terminally
constitutionality
patients and a non-profit organization--challenged
organization-'-Challenged the constitutionality
terminally ill patients
suicide."1I66 The law provides
of Washington's
Washington's statute prohibiting assisted suicide.
provides that a
''person
of promoting
promoting aa suicide
when he
another
is guilty
guilty of
suicide when
he knowingly
knowingly causes or aids another
"person is
person
suicide." 117 The district court
"almost prescriptive"
person to attempt suicide."II?
court saw Casey as "almost
prescriptive"
suicide."1I88 The court concluded
concluded that
in finding a liberty
liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide.
"the suffering of a terminally ill person cannot be deemed any less intimate or
personal,
personal, or any less deserving
deserving of protection
protection from unwarranted
unwarranted governmental
governmental
119
interference, than that of a pregnant woman."
interference,
woman."119
As such,
such, the choice
choice of whether to
physician-assisted suicide resides
commit physician-assisted
resides with those liberties protected by the U.S.
20
Because
Constitution. 120
Because Washington
Washington unequivocally prohibits assisted suicide, the
exercise of competent, terminally ill
court declared
declared that the law unduly burdened
burdened the exercise
21
interest.1121
persons'
persons' rights to exercise
exercise a protected
protected liberty
liberty interest.
On appeal,
appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
Circuit rejected
rejected this reasoning:
To take three sentences out of an opinion over thirty pages in length
dealing with the highly charged
charged subject of abortion and to find these
sentences "almost prescriptive"
prescriptive" in ruling on a statute proscribing
proscribing the
promotion of suicide is to make an enormous leap, to do violence to the
the
differences between
between the regulation of
of
context, and to ignore the differences
reproduction
reproduction and the prevention of the promotion of killing a patient
patient at
113
George J.
Promised End-Constitutional
End-ConstitutionalAspects
of Physician-Assisted
Physician-Assisted
113 See
See George
J. Annas,
Annas, The
The Promised
Aspects of
Suicide, 335 NEW ENG. J.
683, 684 (1996).
(1996).
J. MED.
MED. 683,
114
Id.
1141d.

115
79 F.3d
F.3d 790
790 (9th
(9th Cir.
Cir. 1996).
1996).
115 79
116
at 794.
116 See
See id.
id. at
794.
117
WASH. REV.
REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9A.36.060
9A.36.060 (West
(West 1991).
1991). Violating
Violating the
II? WASH.
CODE ANN.
the statute
statute constitutes
constitutes aa
felony punishable
9A.36.060(2),
punishable by up to five years in prison, and a $10,000
$10,000 fine. See id.
id. §§ 9A.36.060(2),
.20.020(1)(c).
.20.020(1)(c).
The plaintiffs
plaintiffs did not object to the portion
portion of the statute that makes it unlawful for a person to
cause" someone to commit suicide. See Compassion
Dying, 79 F.3d at 797. They challenged the
the
"cause"
Compassion in Dying,
"or aids"
aids" portion of the statute both on its face and as applied
applied to mentally competent, terminally
terminally ill
ill
adults who
who wish to hasten their deaths with the help of medication
medication prescribed
prescribed by their doctors. See
id.
id.
118 See
See Compassion
in Dying
Supp. 1454,
1454, 1459-60
1459-60 (W.O.
(W.D. Wash.
118
Compassion in
Dying v.
v. Washington,
Washington, 850
850 F.
F. Supp.
Wash. 1994).
1994).
119 Id. at 1460.
1191d.
1460.
120 See
See id.
120
id.
121 See
See id.
id. at
at 1465.
1465.
121
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122
. his or her request. 122
The court
court distinguished
distinguished Casey,123
Casey,123 and found
found no constitutional violations
violations in
in
The
Washington's prohibition
prohibition of
of assisted suicide.l
suicide.12424 Citing
Citing its
its "extraordinary
"extraordinary
Washington's
125
importance," the
the Ninth
Ninth Circuit decided to
to rehear
rehear the
the case
case en banc.
banc. 125
importance,"
considered whether
whether aa liberty interest
interest exists
exists in "choosing
"choosing the
the time
time
The court first considered
and manner
manner of
of one's
one's death-a
death-a question
question sometimes
sometimes phrased in
in common parlance as:
and
Is there a right to die?"126
die?"'126 According to the
the court, the range
range of liberties guaranteed
guaranteed
Is
by the
the Due Process Clause
Clause reside on a '''rational
"'rational continuum which,
which, broadly speaking,
by
includes aa freedom
freedom from
from all
all substantial arbitrary impositions and
and purposeless
includes
1 27
restraints.'-'''127
restraints.
The court
court examined
examined historical
historical and
and current
current perspectives,
perspectives, noting that at the time
The
of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, only nine out of thirty-seven states had
of
28 Today, most Americans favor legalized
statutory prohibitions of assisted suicide.l
suicide. 128
statutory
29
physician-assisted suicide.l
suicide.129 However, the court relied primarily on case
case law,
physician-assisted
especially Casey
Casey and
and Cruzan,
Cruzan, to
to find a liberty interest in choosing the time and
and
especially
130
of death.
manner of
death. 130
Extrapolating from
from language in Casey,
Casey, the court noted that like "the decision of
Extrapolating
of
whether or
or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of 'the
whether
most intimate
intimate and
and personal
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,'
lifetime,' a choice
most
'central to personal dignity and autonomy."131 Like abortion,
"die with
'central to
personal dignity and autonomy."'131 Like abortion, choosing to "die
interest.13
1322
implicates a vital liberty interest.
dignity" implicates
In
Justice Rehnquist
recognized that "[t]he
In Cruzan,
Cruzan, Chief
Chief Justice
Rehnquist recognized
"[t]he principle
principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally
competent
constitutionally protected liberty interest
interest in refusing
decisions."1 33 Refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."133
Refusing
of
unwanted care
care includes
includes the withdrawal
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, a course of
34
action
action that necessarily
necessarily induces the patient's death.1
death. 134 The Ninth Circuit concluded
concluded
that Cruzan,
Cruzan, by recognizing
recognizing a liberty
liberty interest that includes
includes refusal
refusal of life-sustaining
life-sustaining
35
treatment, must also recognize
recognize a liberty interest
interest in hastening one's own death.1
death.135

122 Compassion
Compassion in
590 (9th
Cir. 1995).
122
in Dying
Dying v.
v. Washington,
Washington, 49
49 F.3d
F.3d 586,
586, 590
(9th Cir.
1995).
123
123 See
See id.
id. at
at 590-91.
590-91.
124
124 See
See id.
id. at
at 594.
594.
125 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995) (granting a rehearing
125 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995) (granting a rehearing
en banc);
1996)
en
banc); see
see also
also Compassion
Compassion in
in Dying
Dying v.
v. Washington,
Washington, 79
79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996)
(commenting that
granted because
the case's
(commenting
that the
the rehearing
rehearing had
had been
been granted
because of
of the
case's "extraordinary
"extraordinary importance").
126 Id. at 798-99. The liberty interest is not in "committing suicide," but in "controlling the
1~6 Id. at 798-99. The liberty interest is not in "committing suicide," but in "controlling the
time
time and
and manner
manner of
of one's
one's death,"
death," because
because the
the interest
interest encompasses
encompasses aa broader
broader range
range of
of activities
activities than
suicide,
of refusing
refusing or terminating
terminating unwanted
unwanted medical
medical treatment.
treatment. Id.
/d. at 802.
802.
suicide, including
including the
the act
act of
127 Id. at 800 (quoting Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,dissenting)). The
1271d. at 800 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting». The
court
of "fundamental
"fundamental rights."
rights." See
See
court did
did not
not consider
consider whether
whether the
the interests
interests involved
involved rose
rose to
to the
the level
level of
id.
id. at
at 803-04.
803-04.
128 See id. at 809. The court noted generally that "while historical analysis plays a useful role
128 See id. at 809. The court noted generally that "while historical analysis plays a useful role
in
any
in any attempt
attempt to
to determine
determine whether
whether aa claimed
claimed right
right or
or liberty
liberty interest
interest exists,
exists, earlier
earlier legislative
legislative or
or
judicial
of the
the right
right or
or interest
interest isis not
not aa sine
sine qua
qua non."
non." Id.
Id. at
at 805.
805.
judicial recognition
recognition of
129
129 See
See id.
id. at
at 810.
810.
130
16.
130 See
See id.
id. at
at 813;
813; see
see also
also Euthanasia
Euthanasia Favored
Favored in
in Poll,
Poll, N.Y.
N.Y. TIMES,
TIMES, Nov.
Nov. 4,
4, 1991,
1991, at
at AA16.
131
Id.
at
813-14
(quoting
1311d. at 813-14 (quoting Casey,
Casey, 505
505 U.S.
U.S. at
at 851).
851).
132
132 See
See id.
id. at
at 814.
814.
133
133 Cruzan,
Cruzan, 497
497 U.S.
U.S. at
at 278.
278.
134
See
Compassion
in
134 See Compassion in Dying,
Dying, 79
79 F.3d
F.3d at
at 815-16.
815-16.
135
See
id.
at
816.
135 See id. at 816.
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After
After finding a liberty
liberty interest
interest in
in controlling
controlling the
the time and
and manner
manner of
of one's
one's
suicide
of
assisted
death,
court
considered
whether
the
state's
prohibition
assisted
suicide
prohibition
the
state's
whether
court
considered
the
death,
impermissibly burdened
burdened that
that interest
interest with respect
respect to
to competent,
competent, terminally
terminally ill adults
impermissibly
3 66
13
contention
the
dissent's
rejected
The
court
·
court
rejected
contention that
wishing
to
their
deaths.
deaths.'
hasten
their
wishing
involved
interest
liberty
state
actions
are
subject
rational
when
the
liberty
interest
involved does
does
the
test
when
basis
a
rational
to
state actions are subject
37
Applying
not rise to the
the level of
of a fundamental
fundamental right.'
right. 137
Applying a balancing
balancing test, the court
court
important one, the state must
stated that as long as the "liberty
"liberty interest
interest is an important
must shoulder
shoulder
stated
138
burden of justifying
justifying any significant
significant limitations it seeks
seeks to impose."'
impose."138
the burden
The court
state's legitimate
legitimate interests
interests and
and concluded
concluded that
court examined
examined each of the state's
39
139
although
example,
For
identified.'
interest
previously
none
outweighed
liberty
interest
previously
identified.
example,
although
the
liberty
outweighed
none
the state
state has an
an unqualified
unqualified interest
interest in
in preserving
preserving life,
life, including
including the lives
lives of
of
1140
40
case
to
case.
from
fluctuates
of
that
interest
terminally
adults,
interest
fluctuates
case
The
the
strength
ill
adults,
terminally
state's interest
interest decreases
decreases when
when patients
patients cannot
cannot pursue
pursue happiness
happiness or liberty, and
and no
no
state's
141 "Thus,
longer wish
wish to live. 141
"Thus, while the state
state may still
still seek
seek to prolong
prolong the lives of
of
the
will
safeguard
regulations
that
to
enact
terminally
ill
...
patients
or,
more
likely,
enact
safeguard
...
patients
terminally
state's
manner in which decisions to hasten
hasten death
death are
are made, the strength
strength of the state's
manner
circumstances." 1 42
interest is substantially
substantially reduced in such
such circumstances."142
preservation of life, the strength
strength of
of the state's interest in preventing
preventing
Like the preservation
43
to die.'
competent, terminally
terminally ill adults who
who wish
wish to
die. 143
suicide diminishes in the case of competent,
Unlike others who may wish to commit suicide,
suicide, people
people with terminal illnesses
illnesses
Unlike
144
144
only is
life.
"Not
cannot be cured, and frequently cannot find any enjoyment
enjoyment in
interest in preventing
preventing such individuals
individuals from hastening
hastening their deaths of
of
the state's interest
comparatively
insistence on frustrating
frustrating their wishes seems cruel
cruel
comparatively little weight, but its insistence
45
indeed."145
indeed."1
protecting infirm, elderly persons from undue
The state also has an interest in protecting
The
pressure to end their lives from callous, financially burdened, or self-interested
self-interested
46
'that
relatives, or others with influence
influence over them.'
them.146
however: 'that
The court noted, however,
the
ordinarily
death
of
a
person's
impending
will
ordinarily
restrain
temptation
to
knowledge
person's
knowledge
acknowledged that some terminally ill adults
pressure. 147 The court acknowledged
exert undue pressure,147

136 See
See id.
136
id.
at 804.
804.
137 See
See id.
137
id. at
on
interest fluctuates
liberty interest
strength of
the court,
138 Id. According
138Id.
According to
to the
court, the
the strength
of the
the liberty
fluctuates depending
depending on
id. at 834. "When a mentally
certain factors, especially
especially the individual's physical
physical condition. See id.
hasten his death because
coercion, to hasten
competent adult is terminally ill and wishes, free of any coercion,
competent
because his
his
Id.
remaining
remaining days are an unmitigated torture,
torture, that person's liberty interest is at its height." Id.
at 836-37.
836-37.
139 See
See id.
id. at
139
id. at
at 817.
817.
140 See
See id.
140
141 See id. at 820.
142 Id.
142Id.
143 See id.
820-21.
144 See id. at 820-21.
not even
even be
suicide may
interest in
in preventing
preventing suicide
that the
the state's
state's interest
The court
noted that
145 Id. at
at 821.
821. The
145Id.
court noted
may not
be
"physician-assisted
id. at 824. Notwithstanding the use of the term "physician-assisted
implicated in this case. See id.
suicide," the court found no significant difference between
between the prescription of a lethal dose of
of
and hydration (actions
refuse food and
terminate life
life support or refuse
to terminate
medication and a patient's decision to
medication
id.
"suicide"). See
See id.
consider to be "suicide").
which the state does not consider
which
See id.
id. at
at 826.
826.
146 See
146
See id.
id.
147 See
147
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might request
request the lethal dose of medication to protect their families from the expense
expense
48
of prolonged medical treatment.1148
However, although
regulations can help ensure that patients do not make rash,
state regulations
uninformed,
uninformed, or ill considered decisions, we are reluctant to say that, in
so
a society in which the costs of protracted health care can be so
exorbitant,
exorbitant, it is improper for competent, terminally ill adults to take the
49
economic
economic welfare of their families and loved ones into consideration. 149
The state has a legitimate interest in maintaining
maintaining the integrity
integrity of the medical
profession, an interest
interest that prevents
prevents physicians
physicians from engaging
engaging in conduct at odds
50
This should not prevent physicians from providing
with their role as healers.'
healers. ISO
criminalizes
lethal medication,
medication, however. Instead, "it is the existence of a statute that criminalizes
the provision
provision of medical
medical assistance
assistance to patients
patients in need that could create
create conflicts with
the doctors'
professional obligations and make covert
covert criminals
criminals out of honorable,
honorable,
doctors' professional
individuals."'' I In addition,
addition, many physicians have
dedicated, and compassionate
compassionate individuals."lsl
discretely aided terminally ill patients to hasten
discretely
hasten death for decades,
decades, without
52
compromising their ethical standards or the reputation
compromising
reputation of the medical profession. IS2
In applying the balancing test, the court considered
considered not only the state's
state's
53
implemented. IS3
legitimate
legitimate interests, but also the means by which they had been implemented.
Without denying the importance
importance of the state's purposes, the court
court decried the
ls4 The state could satisfy its
harshness of an outright prohibition of assisted suicide.154
harshness
"appropriate, reasonable,
reasonable, and properly drawn
interests
interests more fairly by establishing "appropriate,
55
of the person requesting lethal medication. ISS
competency ofthe
safeguards"
safeguards" to assure the competency
"liberty interest in hastening death is at its strongest
Given that the "liberty
strongest when
when the
state's interest in protecting
protecting life and preventing
preventing suicide
suicide is at its weakest, and viceversa,"
versa," the court
court concluded
concluded that the state could not constitutionally
constitutionally prohibit
56
consenting,
consenting, terminally ill adults from choosing physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide.'
suicide. IS6
The
and
court held that "a liberty
liberty interest
interest exists in the choice of how and when one dies, and
that the provision of the Washington statute banning
banning assisted suicide, as applied to
competent,
competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining
157
medication
medication prescribed by their doctors, violates
violates the Due Process Clause."'
Clause."IS7
If affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit's opinion
opinion in
Compassion
Compassion in Dying would have vast implications.
implications. Within the Ninth Circuit, the
decision
decision would render all state
state laws unequivocally
unequivocally banning assisted suicide
addition, the ruling would
inapplicable to competent, terminally ill patients. In addition,
inapplicable
id.
148
148 See
See id.
149
Id.
149/d.
150
at 827.
ISO See
See id.
id. at
827.
151
Id.
But
see Decisions,
supra note
note 2,
2, at 2232 (condemning
(condemning "the
ISlld. But see
Decisions, supra
"the gradual distortion
distortion of the role
role
of medicine
medicine into something that starkly
starkly contrasts with the current
current vision of a profession
profession dedicated
dedicated to
healing and comforting").
828; see
50-5 1.
152 See
See Compassion
Compassion in
79 F.3d
IS2
in Dying,
Dying, 79
F.3d at
at 828;
see also
also supra
supra notes
notes 50-51.
153 See
See Compassion
Dying, 79
79 F.3d
832.
IS3
Compassion in
in Dying,
F.3d at
at 832.
154 See
See id.
IS4
id.
some potential
potential procedural
"without endorsing
155
Id. at
at 833.
The court
ISS ld.
833. The
court noted
noted some
procedural safeguards,
safeguards, "without
endorsing
voluntariness, short waiting
[their]
Id. Examples included witnesses
witnesses to ensure voluntariness,
[their] constitutionality."
constitutionality." Id.
periods to prevent impulsive decisions and psychological evaluations to guarantee that the patient
patient
id.
does not suffer from treatable depression.
depression. See id.
156 Id. at
at 836-37.
836-37.
IS6Id.
157
Id.
at
838.
IS7 ld. at 838.
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v. Oregon,
Oregon, in which the District Court
Court of Oregon ruled that an Oregon
reverse Lee v.
suicide in certain
certain
initiative which would have allowed physician-assisted suicide
58
58
Clause.1
Protection
Equal
the
violated
circumstances
circumstances
Clause.1

IV. LEGALIZED ASSISTED SUICIDE
A.

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED

Oregon voters were not the first to consider a variation
variation of the Death with
Dignity Act. Washington's ballot initiative was defeated by a margin of fifty-four to
159 The Washington
forty-six percent in 1991.
1991.159
Washington act, similar in many respects to
Oregon's Measure 16, would have allowed mentally "competent"
"competent" patients with
terminal conditions to request physician-assisted
physician-assisted "aid in dying."160
dying."160
Some
commentators
suggest
that
voters
rejected
the
measure
because
it
neither
set
forth
commentators
sufficiently
specific
procedures
for
implementing
sufficiently
implementing the "aid in dying," nor did it
61 However, the Act's scope apparently
adequately define the physician's role.1
role.'61
apparently
62
included
both
voluntary
euthanasia
and
physician-assisted suicide.'
Despite its
included
voluntary euthanasia
physician-assisted
suicide. 162
vagueness, the initiative
vagueness,
initiative "quantified
"quantified the level of public support for assistance in
California."1 63
dying and also provided the impetus for similar legislation in Califomia."163

B.

THE OREGON DEATH
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT
An adult who is capable, is a resident
resident of Oregon, and has been
been
determined
physician to be
determined by the attending physician and consulting
consulting physician
suffering
suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed
expressed
his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for
the purpose
purpose of ending his or her life
life in a humane
humane and dignified manner
manner
64
act.1164
in accordance
accordance with this
thIS act.

Measure 16 sets forth various
requirements and safeguards
physician-assisted
Measure
various requirements
safeguards for physician-assisted
1165
65
suicide.
"Terminal disease"
"Terminal
disease" is defined
defined as "an incurable
incurable and irreversible
irreversible disease
confirmed and will, within reasonable
that has been
been medically
medically confirmed
reasonable medical judgment,

158
Lee v.
F. Supp.
1429, 1437
1437 (D.
(D. Or.
the expected
158 See
See Lee
v. Oregon,
Oregon, 891
891 F.
Supp. 1429,
Or. 1995).
1995). Although
Although the
expected appeal
appeal
of Lee was not at issue here,
here, the
the court
court described
described the holding reached
reached in that case
case as "highly
"highly
irregular," and
and noted
that Chief
Chief Judge
Judge Hogan,
erred." See
irregular,"
noted that
Hogan, author
author of
of the
the Lee opinion, had "clearly
"clearly erred."
Compassion in Dying,
838.
Compassion
Dying, 79 F.3d at 838.
159
8 ISSUES
159 See
See Cheryl
Cheryl K.
K. Smith,
Smith, What
What About
About Legalized
Legalized Assisted
Assisted Suicide?,
SuiCide?, 8
ISSUES L.
L. & MED.
MED. 503,
503,
503 (1993).
(1993).
160
The Impact
160 See
See Jody
Jody B.
B. Gabel,
Gabel, Release
Release From
From Terminal
Terminal Suffering?:
Suffering?: The
Impact of
of AIDS
AIDS on
on Medically
Medically
Assisted
U. L. REV.
Assisted Suicide Legislation,
Legislation, 22
22 FLA.
FLA. ST.
Sr. U.
REV. 369,
369, 411
411 (1994)
(1994) (citing the proposed
proposed
amendment
70.122.060(1) (1991),
amendment to
to WASH.
WASH. REV.
REV. CODE
CODE §§ 70.122.060(1)
(J 991), reprinted
reprinted in OFFICE
OFFICE OF
OF THE
THE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF
OF
THE STATE
STATE OF
OF WASHINGTON,
WASHINGTON, VOTERS
VOTERS PAMPHLET,
PAMPHLET, Initiative
Initiative Measure
Measure 119, at 29).
29).
161
161 See
See id.
id. at
at 413.
413.
162
50, at
at 1240.
"Euthanasia and
suicide differ
differ in
162 See
See Annas,
Annas, supra
supra note
note 50,
1240. "Euthanasia
and assisted
assisted 'suicide
in the
the degree
degree of
of
physician
physician participation. Euthanasia
Euthanasia entails a physician
physician performing
performing the
the immediate
immediate life-ending acac. . .Assisted
tion .....
Assisted suicide occurs when a physician
physician facilitates aa patient's
patient's death by
by providing the
necessary means
means and/or
act." Decisions,
necessary
and/or information
information to
to enable
enable the
the patient
patient to
to perform
perform the
the life-ending
life-ending act."
Decisions,
supra
note 2,2, at
at 2229.
2229.
supra note
163
160, at
163 Gabel,
Gabel, supra
supra note
note 160,
at 413.
413.
164
164 Death
Death with
with Dignity
Dignity Act,
Act, OR.
OR. REV.
REV. STAT.
STAT. ch.
ch. 127.805,
127.805, §§ 2.01
2.01 (1995).
(1995).
165
165 See
See id.
id. chs.
chs. 127.800-.897.
127.800-.897.
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produce death within six (6)
medication must be witnessed
witnessed
produce
(6) months."166
months."' 66 Requests for medication
by two individuals who attest that the patient is "capable,
"capable, acting voluntarily, and is
167
not being coerced to sign the request."'
The attending
request."167
attending physician is required to
determine
whether
the
patient
has
a
terminal
disease,
determine
terminal disease, and has made a voluntary
68
request for medication.
The physician must also inform
medication.1168
inform the patient of alternatives
to suicide,
mandatory second opinion
suicide, refer the patient to a consulting physician for a mandatory
confirmation of the original diagnosis and refuse to give the patient the lethal
for confirmation
medication
medication if it appears that he or she suffers from a psychological
psychological disorder or
69
depression causing
causing impaired
Clearly, the drafters of Measure 16
depression
impaired judgment. 169
16
70
intended to shield doctors and patients
patients from possible abuses of the system.1
system. 170
However, in invalidating Measure
16, the·U.S.
the U.S. District Court for the District of
of
Measure 16,
17
Oregon noted that its protections
protections against abuses of the system
system were
were inadequate.'
inadequate.!71
In
particular, the court
"imprecision and inadequacy
inadequacy of protections
protections
court took issue with the "imprecision
172
leading to the prescription
prescription of drugs."'
Although
Measure
drugs."172
M~!isure 16 sets forth the
conditions under which a person will receive the medication,
medication: it does not require the
recipient to take the medication
medication at any particular time or place, and does not demand
73
supervision.1173
This leaves the potential for people who physicians
supervision.
physidans deem competent
competent
at the time they prescribe
prescribe the medication to suffer undue influence
influence at some later
later
"relationship between Measure 16's classification
point. The "relationship
classification and the goal of
of
permitting assisted suicide
of
suicide is too attenuated
attenuated without some protection
protection at the time of
174
taking the fatal drug dosage."'
dosage."174
C.

16
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT
COURT CORRECTLY
CORRECTLY RULED THAT MEASURE 16
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT
U.S. CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTION
TO THE U.S.

Oregon, Judge Hogan held that Measure
Measure 16 violates the Equal
In Lee v. Oregon,
ill the same
Protection Clause, because
because it denies the terminally
terminally ilr
same protection against
against
5 The court found no rational
suicide afforded the remainder of Oregon's
citizens. 175Oregon's citizens.l7
relation between
between Measure 16's denial of protection to depressed, terminally
terminally ill

166 Id. ch.
127.800, §
§ 1.0
1.01(12).
1661d.
ch. 127.800,
I (12).
167
Id.
ch.
127.810(1),
2.02(1).
1671d. ch. 127.810(1), §§ 2.02(1).
168 See
See id.
id. ch.
ch. 127.815,
3.01.
168
127.815, §§ 3.01.
169 See
See id.
id. ch.
127.815, §§ 3.01(2)-(3);
3.01(2)-(3); id.
3.03. Critics
of legalized
legalized assisted
169
ch. 127.815,
id. ch.
ch. 127.825,
127.825, §§ 3.03.
Critics of
assisted
suicide argue
argue that physicians would be unable to make accurate psychological
psychological evaluations. See
HENDIN,
supra note 43,
"like other .suicidal
suicidal
HENDIN, supra
43, at 243. This might be critical,
critical, assuming
assuming that, "like

individuals,
[usually suffer] from a
individuals, patients
patients who desire an early death during aa terminal illness [usually
treatable mental illness, most commonly
commonly aa depressive condition."
Id. at 242-43. According to Dr.
condition." ld.
Hendin,
"thorough psychiatric evaluation for the presence of aa treatable disorder may literally
literally
Hendin, a "thorough
make aa life or death difference
difference for patients who say they wish to die or to have
have aa physician
physician help them
to do so."
so." ld.
Id. at 243. These observations do not justify the continued
continued prohibition of assisted
assisted
suicide.
suicide. They do, however, counsel in favor of supplementing existing
existing safeguards
safeguards with mandatory
psychiatric
evaluation.
psychiatric evaluation.
170 Drafters
of Measure
16 expected
expected its
its enactment
enactment in
part because
its scope
scope was
was more
limited
170
Drafters of
Measure 16
in part
because its
more limited
than failed initiatives
in
California
and
Washington.
See
Annas,
supra
1241.
initiatives
Washington.
supra note 50, at 1241.
171 See
Lee v.
v. Oregon,
Oregon, 891
891 F.
1429, 1437
1437 (D.
Or. 1995).
1995).
171
See Lee
F. Supp.
Supp. 1429,
(D. Or.
172 Id.
172
[d.
173
173 See
See id.
id.
174
1741d.
Id.

175
id. at
at 1438.
1438.
175 See
See id.
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176 The
people from
from their suicidal
suicidal impulses
impulses and the
the state's
state's interests.
interests. 176
The reasoning
reasoning behind
behind
people
court's conclusion
conclusion'provides
opportunity to
to test
test its
its equal protection
protection analysis.
analysis.
provides an opportunity
the court's
Courts choose
choose among levels
levels of
of scrutiny when
when considering
considering cases
cases that implicate
implicate
178
77
If the
the Equal
Equal Protection,
Protection. Clause.1
Clause. 177.
the statute
statute is based
based on
on aa "suspect
"suspect classification"'
classification"178
such as race
race or national
national origin;
origin; or if it restricts
restricts a "fundamental"
"fundamental" right such
such as the
the
such
179
strict
right to procreate
procreate or the right to vote,
vote,179
strict scrutiny
scrutiny is the applicable
applicable standard
standard of
of
further
a
compelling
it
is
necessary
to
passes
strict
scrutiny
when
review. A law
law
strict scrutiny
necessary
a compelling
80
governmental interest.'
interest. 180
governmental
affect aa suspect
suspect class
class of
of persons
persons or restrict a fundamental
If the law fails to affect
rational
relation
test, under which
will
generally
apply
a
right, then courts
courts will generally apply a rational
which legislation
legislation
is
rationally
is presumed
presumed valid if "a
"a classification
classification drawn by a statute
statute is rationally related
related to a
81
legitimate state
state interest."'
interest."181
purported to use the rational
rational relation
relation test
The court purported
882
2
A
"suspect")
classification.
because
the
"terminally
ill"
is
an
ordinary
(not
"suspect")
classification.t
ordinary (not
"terminally ill" is
because
some fit between
between the
classification rationally
rationally furthers aa state
state interest
interest when there is some
classification
83 A classification
disparate treatment and the
the legislative
legislative purpose.'
purpose.1 83
classification cannot
cannot fail the
disparate
presented to
considerations presented
"so long as 'it
'it is evident from all the considerations
rational
rational relation test "so
' 184
9
debatable.'
at
least
is
question
the
that
...
the [lawmaker]
[lawmaker] ...
least debatable. "'184
Appropriate
Appropriate equal protection
protection analysis therefore requires a judicial
judicial
determination both of the legitimacy
legitimacy of a state's
state's interest, and of the means the state
determination
85
chose to effectuate
effectuate its goal. I85
Oregon claimed
claimed the following interests
interests in allowing
Oregon
physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide for the terminally
terminally ill:
(1) avoiding unnecessary pain
pain and suffering; (2)
(2) preserving
preserving and
and
competent adults to make their own critical
enhancing the right of competent
enhancing
(3) avoiding tragic cases
health care decisions; (3)
cases of attempted
attempted or
or
successful
successful suicides in a less humane
humane and dignified manner; (4)
protecting the terminally
protecting
terminally ill and their loved ones
ones from financial
and
(5) protecting
protecting the terminally
hardships they wish to avoid; and (5)
terminally ill and
their loved ones from unwanted intrusions into their personal affairs by
by
86
others.1186
law enforcement
enforcement officers
officers and others.
1437.
176
176 See
See id.
id. at
at 1437.
177
See
City
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985)
(1985)
177 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
employed by courts to determine state legislation's
scrutiny employed
legislation's validity under
under
(discussing standards of scrutiny
an equal protection
protection challenge).
493-95 (1989)
(holding that
Croson Co.,
Co., 488
City of
of Richmond
Richmond v.
J.A. Croson
178
See City
178 See
v. JA
488 U.S.
U.S. 469,
469, 493-95
(1989) (holding
that
discrimination against any racial group merits strict scrutiny).
670 (1966)
(1966) (holding
(holding that
that poll
Elections, 383
383 U.S.
663, 668,
668, 670
Virginia Bd.
Bd. of
of Elections,
179
See Harper
Harper v.
179 See
v. Virginia
U.S. 663,
poll
taxes restrict the fundamental right to vote, and thus violate the equal protection clause).
City o/Cleburne,
of Cleburne, 473
473 U.S.
U.S. at
at 440.
440.
180 See
See City
180
(1981) (stating
(stating that
that
v. Wilson,
Wilson, 450
450 U.S.
U.S. 221,
at 1437;
1437; see
Schweiker v.
181 Lee,
Lee, 891
F. Supp.
Supp. at
181
891 F.
see Schweiker
221, 230
230 (1981)
rationally
the Court has required legislation which classifies groups of people to be, at a minimum, rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective).
See Lee,
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1431
1431 n.2.
n.2.
182 See
182
Lee, 891
891 F.
183 See
See id.
id. at
at 1432.
1432.
183
(1981) (quoting
(quoting United
United States
Co., 449
449 U.S.
U.S. 456,
456, 464
464 (1981)
Clover Leaf
Creamery Co.,
184 Minnesota
Minnesota v.
184
v. Clover
Leaf Creamery
States
153-54 (1938)).
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54
(1938».
Measure 16
16
analysis that
that the
the purposes
purposes of
of constitutional
constitutional analysis
185 It
It is
is irrelevant
irrelevant for
for the
185
the public
public enacted
enacted Measure
by referendum, as opposed to traditional legislative process. See Citizens Against Rent Control v.
(1981).
of Berkeley, 454
454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
City of
lethal dose
dose of
of
would limit
limit the
the right
right to
to receive
receive aa lethal
at 1434.
1434. Measure
Measure 16
16 would
186 Lee,
Lee, 891
891 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. at
186
fewer than six months to live. See Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.
medication to those with fewer
proponents would eventually
Some of
of the Measure's proponents
id. ch. 127.805,
127.805, § 2.01.
2.01. Some
127.800, §§ 1.01; id.
ch. 127.800,
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The Oregon
Oregon court
court made
made no
no finding
finding that
that any
any of
of the
the state's
state's interests
interests were
were
The
87 Under rational basis review,
iIlegitimate. 187
the court
court next
next moved
moved to
to the
the fit
fit between
between
Under rational basis review, the
illegitimate.'
88
the means
m~ans employed
employed by
by Measure
Measure 16
16 and
and the
the state's
state's legitimate
legitimate interests.
interests.l188
the
The court
court employed
employed faulty
faulty reasoning
reasoning in
in reaching
reaching its conclusion
conclusion that
that no rational
rational
The
relation existed
existed between
between the
the classification
classification drawn
drawn and
and the
the legitimate
legitimate state
state interests.
interests.
relation
The court
court misinterpreted
misinterpreted the
the means
means employed
employed to
to further
further the
the end
end involved.
involved. Measure
Measure
intended to
to grant
grant the
the right
right of
of physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide
suicide to
to competent,
competent, terminally
terminally
16 intended
89
ill people
people to
to further
further the
the goal
goal of
of preventing
preventing suffering,
suffering, among
among other
other things.'
things. 189
ill
However, the court
court analyzed
analyzed the
the classification
classification in
in an entirely
entirely different
different light,
However,
suicide
assisted
prohibiting
considering
Measure
16
together
Oregon's
prohibiting
assisted
suicide
law
Oregon's
with
together
16
Measure
considering
90 The court then declared
generally.190
that the
the primary
primary purpose
purpose of that
that statute
statute was
was to
The court then declared that
generally.1
91
protect the
the population
population against
against suicide. 1191
As such, Measure
Measure 16
16 served
served as an
As
protect
exception to Oregon's
Oregon's prohibition
prohibition against
against assisted
assisted suicide,
suicide, denying
denying the
the terminally
terminally ill
ill
exception
92
From this
same protection
protection from suicide
suicide that the rest of
of the
the population
population enjoyed.'
enjoyed. 192
this
the same
perspective, it becomes
becomes somewhat
somewhat easier
easier to
to understand
understand the court's
court's conclusion
conclusion that no
no
perspective,
relation existed
existed in this case. Denying the
the terminally
terminally ill protection
protection from their
their
rational relation
preventing suffering,
suffering, or
or
suicidfil impulses
impulses may
may not relate closely
closely to aa state goal
goal of preventing
suicidal
enhancing
rights
competent
critical
health
care
decisions.
decisions.
health
make
critical
to
adults
of
competent
the
rights
enhancing
that Oregon's
Oregon's prohibition
prohibition of
of
Underlying the court's
court's decision
decision is the notion that
Underlying
protection
life
and
assisted
suicide
based
interests
in
the
"preservation
of
life
and
protection
the
"preservation
on
interests
based
is
suicide
assisted

court's notice. See Lee,
extend the privilege to all consenting adults, a fact that did not escape the court's
Supp. at 1432.
1432. Judge Hogan,
Hogan, while purporting to analyze the relevant constitutional issues in
in
891 F. Supp.
smaller class defined in the statute,
statute, seemed concerned
concerned about a slippery
the context of the much smaller
slope:
slope:
While a diagnosis of terminal illness with less that [sic] six months to live may be a
persuasive rational basis for some to choose suicide, there is little limit to the
Where in the
justifications which can be advanced for state-sanctioned suicide. Where
Constitution do we find distinctions between the terminally ill with six months to live,
the terminally ill with one year to live, paraplegics, the disabled, or any category of
of
living?
people who have their own reasons for not wanting to continue living?
Id. at 1432 n.3. Although such considerations may concern the court, potential future classifications
Id.
classification as drawn.
should
should not have interfered with its equal protection analysis of the classification
equal
holding equal
interests, but
asserted state
state interests,
furthers asserted
the act
act furthers
(noting that
1434-37 (noting
id. at
at 1434-37
187 See
187
See id.
that the
but holding
"severely overinclusive class").
protection violation based on "severely
1434.
See id.
at 1434.
188
188 See
id. at
is suspicious,
suspicious,
group is
to aa particular
particular group
right to
16 as
denying aa right
Measure 16
id. Consideration
Consideration of
189 See id.
189
of Measure
as denying
class. Equal protection
because the law was obviously intended to grant an additional right to that class.
analysis based on
classification as obviously intended by the electorate (granting aa right to
on the classification
the goal of preventing
competent, terminally ill
ill people) shows more than aa mere rational relation to the
suffering. Fifty-two percent of Oregon
Oregon voters believed in the strength of the connection. See
Caplan, supra
3.
11, at 3.
supranote II,
"aiding
(providing "aiding
(1995) (providing
163.117 (1995)
STAT. §§ 163.117
OR. REV.
REV. STAT.
see also
also OR.
1433-34; see
id. at
at 1433-34;
190 See
See id.
190
crimes).
commission of suicide"
but not to manslaughter or other crimes).
murder, but
suicide" as aa defense to murder,
that
on the
the idea
idea that
his ruling
ruling on
premise his
seems to
to premise
Hogan seems
1434. Judge
Judge Hogan
Supp. at
at 1434.
891 F.
F. Supp.
191 See
See Lee,
Lee, 891
191
16 singles
singles
"Measure 16
from committing suicide: "Measure
prevent people from
suicide actually prevent
assisted suicide
laws banning assisted
of
the protection of
them from
from the
suicide and excludes them
commit suicide
out terminally
terminally ill persons who want to commit
not criminalize
criminalize
states do
do not
15 states
Oregon laws that apply
Id. at 1438. However, approximately IS
others." Id.
apply to
to others."
478.
note 82,
82, at 478.
supra note
See MEISEL, supra
impact. See
seemingly with negligible impact.
suicide, seemingly
assisted suicide,
Circuit
the Ninth
Ninth Circuit
Washington, the
Dying v.
v. Washington,
in Dying
In Compassion
Compassion in
at 1438.
1438. In
Supp. at
Lee, 89IF.
891 F. Supp.
192 See
See Lee,
192
ill are
are
terminally ill
the terminally
conclude the
"The benefit
benefit we conclude
on this
this point: "The
reasoning on
rejected Judge Hogan's reasoning
Judge
precisely what Judge
suicide-is precisely
to physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide-is
this case-the
case-the right to
receive in
in this
to receive
entitled to
and aa
benefit and
burden as aa benefit
Lee treats aa burden
In short,
short, Lee
thus unlawful. In
burden and thus
Hogan determined
to be aa burden
determined to
Cir. 1996).
1996).
838 (9th
(9th Cir.
erred." 79
79 F.3d 790, 838
clearly erred."
Hogan clearly
benefit
In doing so, Judge Hogan
as a burden. In
benefit as
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against suicide."193
suicide."' 193 Yet, as previously
previously noted, laws against assisted
assisted suicide derive
194
195
from English common'
common law,
law,194 which was largely
largely based on religious ideology.
ideology.195
Christianity condemns suicide as self-murder,
self-murder, and a direct contradiction
contradiction of the Sixth
"[t]hou shalt not kill."196 Clearly, state laws which
Commandment decree that "[t]hou
criminalize
beliefs,197 rather than
criminalize assisted suicide are based on moral and religious beliefs,197
concern
incompetent or severely
severely depressed persons may be
concern that without such laws, incompetent
more likely to kill themselves.
themselves. Even if we assume, however,
however, that underlying the
prohibition
prohibition of assisted suicide is protection of citizens from taking their lives, the
district court's ruling appears
appears faulty.
.
"[i]t is
is 'rational'
'rational' to conclude that competent terminally
The court declared
declared that "[i]t
ill persons may not want protection from their suicidal impulses."198
impulses."198 Although
Measure
competent adults, the court
Measure 16 tailored its classification
classification to
to' competent
court found
99
competency determination.
determination.1199
court's
insufficient safeguards in the competency
Central to the court's
ruling is its concern
Measure 16 would not prevent mentally
concern that Measure
mentally incompetent,
2oo The court
terminally ill patients
patients from committing suicide. 200
court stated that suicide is an
improper alternative whenever
whenever patients
patients suffer from treatable depression or mental
20
illness. 2011
Because certain terminally ill patients may wish to commit suicide because
of
Because
because of
impaired judgment due to treatable
depression,
the
court
reasoned
that
the
state
treatable depression,
court reasoned
failed to serve its interest in enhancing
enhancing personal
personal autonomy in health care decision
202
making. 202
The state had argued that because the right to assisted suicide applies
only to "competent"
"competent" adults, the danger of mentally disturbed terminally ill patients
203
receiving
medication is reduced. 203
Under
receiving the medication
Under Measure
Measure 16, the patient's request for
for
the medication
medication must be witnessed
witnessed by at least two individuals who attest that "to
"to the
best oftheir
of their knowledge
knowledge and
and belief
belief the
the patient
patient is
is capable,
is
capable, acting voluntarily, and is

193 Lee,
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1434.
193
Lee, 891
891 F.
1434.
194 See
Mary M.
Assisted Suicide:
A Tough
Tough Pill
20 PEPP.
194
See Mary
M. Penrose,
Penrose, Assisted
Suicide: A
Pill to
to Swallow,
Swallow, 20
PEPP. L.
L. REV.
REV. 689,
689, 701
701
(1993).
.
(1993).
id. at 696-700.
195 See id.
196 Exodus 20:13.
"Although most
most interpreters
agree that
that the
the Sixth
apparently
196.Exodus
20: 13. "Although
interpreters agree
Sixth Commandment
Commandment apparently
is not a direct mandate against
analogous to homicide,
against suicide, the implication
implication is that suicide
suicide is analogous
homicide, and
therefore is similarly
Commandment's mandate against killing."
killing." Penrose,
similarly covered
covered by the Sixth Commandment's
Penrose,
supra note 194,
194, at 696 n.41.
n.41. Both Judaism and Islam parallel
supra
parallel ideology of the Catholic Church,
Church,
rejecting
Mangini, supra
supra note 36, at 736-37.
rejecting suicide
suicide as direct taking of human life. See Mangini,
197 See
Penrose, supra
194, at
that the
religious influence
influence of
of the
197
See generally
generally Penrose,
supra note
note 194,
at 696
696 (noting
(noting that
the religious
the
Catholic
Catholic Church "is
"is certain
certain to pervade the assisted suicide debate in a similar manner" to that of the
abortion
abortion debate). These laws
laws stem from the idea that "[e]veryone
"[ e ]veryone has a moral duty to respect
respect the
sanctity
sanctity of human life, that is, to refrain
refrain from any act that can reasonably be expected to cause
cause
another
death." BURTON
AND MORALS:
MORALS:
another human
human being's
being's death."
BURTON M. LEISER,
LEISER, LIBERTY,
LIBERTY, JUSTICE, AND
CONTEMPORARY
(discussing abortion laws).
CONTEMPORARY VALUE
VALUE CONFLICTS 107 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing
laws).
198 Lee,
891 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1434.
1434.
198
Lee, 891
199 See
id.
199
See id.
200
id. at
1433.
200 See
See id.
at 1433.
201
See
id.
at
1434.
201 See id. 'at 1434.
202
id. at
1433.
202 See
See id.
at 1433.
203
at 1434.
1434. The
to "incompetent"
16's
203 See
See id.
id. at
The court's
court's references
references to
"incompetent" individuals
individuals parallel
parallel Measure
Measure 16's
use of the word "incapable,"
meaning
that
when
"in
the
opinion
of
the
court
or
in
the
opinion
of
the
"incapable,"
"in
patient's
physician, a patient
patient's attending
attending physician
physician or consulting physician,
patient lacks the ability to make
make and
communicate
communicate health
health care
care decisions
decisions to health care providers,
providers, including communication through
th':ough
persons
communicating if those persons are available."
available." Death
persons familiar with the patient's manner
manner of communicating
with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.
STAT. ch. 127.800, § 1.01(6).
1.01(6).
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20 4
not being
being coerced
coerced to
to sign
sign the
the request."
request."204
In addition,
addition, the
the first
first attending
attending physician
physician
In
not
205
After
capable."
must
make
an
"initial
determination
of
whether
a
patient
...
is
is
capable."205
After the
the
...
a
patient
must make an "initial determination of whether
aa
to
patient
the
refer
determination
is
made,
the
first
attending
physician
must
refer
the
patient
to
must
determination is made, the first attending physician
"consulting
of the
"consulting physician"
physician" for
for "medical
"medical confirmation
confirmatiol) .of
the.diagnosis,
diagnosis, and
and for
for aa
206
determination that
that the
the patient
patient is
is capable."
capable."206
determination
Either the
the attending
attending or
or the
the consulting
consulting physician
physician may,
may, "if
"if appropriate,"
appropriate," refer
refer the
the
Either
2207
0 7 Measure 16
aa
end
to
medication
"[n]o
that
patient
for
counseling.
16
makes
clear
that
"[n]o
medication
to
end
makes clear
Measure
patient for counseling.
person
the
until
prescribed
patient's
life
in
a
humane
and
dignified
manner
shall
be
prescribed
until
the
person
patient's life in a humane and dignified manner shall be
performing the
the counseling
counseling determines
determines that
that the
the patient
patient isis not
not suffering
suffering from a
performing
judgment." 208
impaired
causing
depression
or
psychiatric
or
psychological
disorder,
or
depression
causing
impairedjudgment."208
psychiatric or psychological disorder,
Despite these
these protections,
protections, the
the court
court reasoned
reasoned that
that some
some mentally
mentally incompetent,
incompetent,
Despite
the
receive
and
cracks"
terminally
ill
patients
would
"slip
through
the
cracks"
and
receive
the lethal
lethal
terminally ill patients would "slip through the
competent
the
between
medication
because
the
"procedures
designed
to
differentiate
between
the
competent
differentiate
medication because the "procedures designed
209 This occurs primarily
and incompetent
incompetent are
are not
not sufficient."
sufficient."209
because the
the physicians
physicians
occurs primarily because
and
210
The
training.
charged
with
making
such
judgments
may
not
have
sufficient
training.210
The court
court
charged with making such judgments may not have sufficient
is
a
person
when
determine
noted
that
under
"Measure
16,
a
treating
physician
must
determine
a
person
noted that under "Measure 16, treating physician
people
in
common
common
people
beyond
help
and
not
merely
suffering
from
treatable
depression
depression
treatable
beyond help and not merely suffering
21
with terminal
terminal illnesses."
illnesses."2111
with
Basing aa competency
competency decision
decision on
on whether
whether a person
person is suffering
suffering from treatable
treatable
Basing
problematic.
be
may
illnesses"
depression
"common
in
people
with
terminal
illnesses"
be
problematic.
It
terminal
depression "common in people with
seems reasonable
reasonable to expect
expect that
that persons diagnosed
diagnosed with
with a terminal
terminal disease
disease will be
be
212 It does not
depressed,212
not follow,
follow, however, that
that the state should prevent
prevent them from
It
depressed.
completely at
receiving the
the lethal dose of medication.
medication. It is less likely
likely that a person completely
at
ease with his or her illness
illness will take advantage
advantage of physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide. For this
reason, the drafters of Measure
Measure 16 probably meant to include only
only the truly
depression,
despondent
and
irrational,
rather
than
persons
with
treatable
depression,
in the Act's
Act's
despondent
213
judgment."
impaired
definition of those for whom "depression
"depression caus[es]
impaired
judgment."213
Yet
caus[es]
classification
that
because
of
its
perceived
inadequacies,
the
court
determined
the
classification
court determined
perceived inadequacies,
because
214
overinclusive. 214
drawn ("terminally
ill" patients) was overinclusive.
("terminally ill"
drawn
overinclusive. It is possible to
The court may have correctly found Measure 16 overinclusive.
imagine that the attending
attending and consulting
consulting physicians
physicians might prescribe lethal
medication after mistakenly
mistakenly assessing the patient's competency.
competency. However, the court
overinclusive." 2 15
"severely overinclusive."215
describes the
class
as
defined
by
Measure
16
as "severely
as
the
should not receive the
Although some individuals
individuals within the classification should
medication, the court
fails
to
cite
evidence
that
this
subgroup
composes more than
court

2.02(1).
127.810, §§ 2.02(1).
ch. 127.810,
STAT. ch.
REV. STAT.
204 OR. REV.
204
3.01(1).
127.815, §§ 3.01(1).
205 Id.ch. 127.815,
205Id.
06 Id.
3.01(3).
Id. §§ 3.01(3).
7206

3.01(4).
id. §§ 3.01(4).
207 See id.
207
3.03.
127.825, §§ 3.03.
ch. 127.825,
208 Id. ch.
208Id.
1995).
Or. 1995).
(D. Or.
1434 (D.
1429, 1434
F. Supp.
Supp. 1429,
891 F.
Oregon, 891
v. Oregon,
209 Lee
Lee v.
209
at 1435.
1435.
id. at
See id.
210 See
210
Id.
211 Id.
211
feelings
and feelings
guilt and
alienation, guilt
from alienation,
suffer from
commonly suffer
people commonly
ill people
"seriously ill
that "seriously
(noting that
id. (noting
See id.
212 See
212
of
.
unworthiness").
ofunworthiness").
3.03.
127.825, §§ 3.03.
ch. 127.825,
STAT. ch.
REV. STAT.
OR. REV.
213 See
See OR.
213
1437.
at 1437.
Supp. at
891 F.
F. Supp.
See Lee,
Lee, 891
214 See
214
id.
See id.
215 See
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fraction of
of the "terminally
"terminally ill."216 As the U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court noted in
in
the tiniest fraction
York City Transit
Transit Authority v. Beazer,
Beazer, "it
"it is of no constitutional significance
significance
New York
certain ill-defined
ill-defined
that the degree of rationality is not as great with respect to certain
as aa whole."217
whole." 217
classification as
classification as it is with respect to the classification
subparts of the classification
deferential nature of rational basis review, the court
court should
should have upheld
Given the deferential
Measure
Measure 16 against the equal protection challenge.
Oregon opinion suggested an interesting question: whether a more
The Lee v. Oregon
appropriate
appropriate equal protection analysis would focus on the denial of the right of
of
218 "While the
assisted suicide to citizens of Oregon other than the terminally ill.
ill.218
practical
practical effect of a state law may be to create some inequality between particular
particular
. . . , it cannot create an illusory classification where the reasons
classes of persons ...
for the law apply equally to all members of the public."219
public." 219 If Measure
Measure 16 rests on
notions
of
autonomy,
then
all
citizens
should
enjoy
the
right
to
physician-assisted
physician-assisted
notions of autonomy, then
220 Of course, this argument
suicide. 22o
could not advance far, given the current state of
of
today. 221
public opinion today.221

216 See
See id.
id. The
The court
"Measure 16
states that
16 provides
provides aa means
means to
to commit
commit suicide
suicide to
to aa
216
court only
only states
that "Measure
influenced or abused
severely overinclusive
overinclusive class who may be competent, incompetent,
incompetent, unduly
unduly influenced
abused by
others." Id.
others."
Id.
440 U.S.
(1979); see
see a/so
also FCC
v. Beach
113 S.
S. Ct.
Ct. 2096,
217 440
U.S. 568,
568, 593
593 (1979);
FCC v.
Beach Communications,
Communications, Inc.,
Inc., 113
2096,
challenge if
2101 (1993)
(1993) (holding that a classification
classification "must be upheld
upheld against an equal
equal protection
protection challenge
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
there is any reasonably conceivable
classification");
classification"); Dandridge
Dandridge v. Williams,
Williams, 397
397 U.S.
U.S. 471,
471, 485 (1970)
(1970) (holding that state legislation
legislation
"does not violate the
"does
the Equal
Equal Protection Clause
Clause merely because
because the classifications
classifications [it makes]
makes] are
imperfect").
imperfect").
218
See Lee,
F. Supp.
Supp. at
1438 (suggesting
that one
of the
problems with
Measure 16
218 See
Lee, 891
891 F.
at 1438
(suggesting that
one of
the problems
with Measure
16 is
is its
its
inability
to
limit
"rational suicide"
competent, terminally
terminally
inability to limit "rational
suicide" to the hard
hard cases). "The
"The suffering
suffering of some competent,
ill persons
persons gives
gives rise to compassionate
compassionate arguments."
arguments." Id.
219 Id. at
at 1433.
219Id.
1433.
220 A
A response
to this
the reasons
16 do
do not
220
response to
this argument
argument is
is that
that the
reasons for
for Measure
Measure 16
not apply
apply equally
equally to
to all
all
exception for terminally
terminally ill patients under Measure
Measure
citizens. Principal interests cited
cited in creating an exception
suffering," and protecting "the
16 include
include avoiding "unnecessary
"unnecessary pain
pain and
and suffering,"
"the terminally
terminally ill and their
their
loved
ones from financial hardships."
hardships." Id.
Id. at 1434.
loved ones
1434. Certainly these
these interests
interests are
are particular to
to the
measure intended
intended to help.
class of persons the measure
221
221 Consider
Consider an
an editorial
editorial written
written shortly
shortly after
after Judge
Judge Hogan's
Hogan's decision:
decision:
Do
Do you suppose
suppose that dying
dying Oregonians,
Oregonians, fighting
fighting the
the pain
pain of
Of cancer
cancer or
or the
the indignities
indignities of
of
dependency,
dependency, are
are relieved
relieved to know
know that aa federal
federal judge
judge doesn't
doesn't want
want them discriminated
discriminated
against?
commentary on the strange
appalling commentary
strange twist the
the
against? .. . . The ruling isis an appalling
discrimination
discrimination argument
argument has taken. Next thing
thing you know,
kilOW, Oregonians
Oregonians who
who do not have
have
aa terminal
terminal disease
disease will claim
claim that the law
law discriminates against
against them
them because
because they
they don't
don't
have
have the
the right to get
get a doctor to help them
them die.
die.
Dying
and Discrimination:
Case Misconstrues
Dying and
Discrimination: Death with Dignity
Dignity'Case
Misconstrues the
the Issue, PEORIA
PEORIA J.J. STAR,
STAR, Aug.
15,
1995, at A4.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d
F.3d 586,
586, 591 (9th
(9th Cir.
Cir. 1995),
1995), rev'd, 79
79
15, 1995,
A4. In Compassion
F.3d
1996), the
F.3d 790
790 (9th
(9th Cir.
Cir. 1996),
the court
court derided
derided the
the possibility:
possibility:
If
If at
at the
the heart
heart of
of liberty
liberty protected
protected by
by the
the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment
Amendment is
is this
this uncurtailable
uncurtailable
ability
ability to believe
believe and
and to act on one's deepest
deepest beliefs
beliefs about
about life, the right to suicide
suicide and
and
the
to assistance
assistance in
in suicide
suicide are
are the
the prerogative
prerogative of
of at
at least every
every sane adult. The
the right
right to
attempt
the terminally
terminally ill is illusory.
illusory. If
If such
such liberty
liberty exists
exists in
attempt to restrict
restrict such
such rights to the
this
. . every
. . The
this context
context, ....
every man
man and
and woman
woman in the
the United
United States
States must
must enjoy
enjoy it. ....
The
conclusion
reductio ad
ad absurdum.
conclusion isis aa reductio
Id.
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WHETHER MEASURE
MEASURE 16
16 VIOLATES
VIOLATES THE
THE DUE
DUE PROCESS
PROCESS CLAUSE
CLAUSE OF THE
THE
WHETHER
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT
FOURTEENTH
Although the district
district court
court in Lee declined
declined to
to address
address the plaintiffs
plaintiffs due
due process
process
Although

222
claim,222
receive judicial
judicial attention
attention before
before any'law
any'law allowing
all~wing assisted
assisted suicide
itit must receive
claim,

becomes effective. The reviewing
reviewing court
court should
should employ'rational
employ' rational basis review
review for
for
becomes
223 Under
those acts that do not materially
materially impair
impair a fundamental
fundamental right. 223
Under rational
rational basis
those
review, a law
law does not violate due
due process if the court
court determines
determines that
that it rationally
rationally
review,
224
legitimate government
government interest. 224
The court's
court's disposition of the equal
relates to a legitimate
protection challenge
challenge demonstrates
demonstrates that Measure
Measure 16
16 implicates
implicates no fundamental
fundamental
protection
226
225
right.22S
such, courts
courts generally
generally defer to legislative
legislative judgment. 226
As such,
right.
The plaintiffs claim
claim that the rights of depressed,
depressed, terminally
terminally ill people
people "are
"are
The
affected adversely
adversely by allowing
allowing assisted
assisted suicide
suicide without creating
creating adequate
adequate safeguards
safeguards
affected
protect them from self-harm."227
context of equal
equal protection,
protection, the state
self-harm." 227 As in the context
to protect
respond that the law protects
protects such
such individuals
individuals through its process
process of
of screening
screening
would respond
incompetent. However,
However, in Lee, the
the court found such
out those thought to be incompetent.
228
procedures would not protect the lives of depressed, terminally
terminally ill people. 228 If
If
procedures
swayed by reasoning
reasoning employed
employed in Lee, the reviewing court
court would
would likely declare
declare that
swayed
29
ill.229
Measure 16 violates
violates the due process rights of the incompetent, terminally
terminally il1.2
Measure
E.

OVERCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES
HURDLES BY
BY MODIFYING
MODIFYING MEASURE
MEASURE 16
OVERCOMING

If eventually struck
struck down, Measure
Measure 16 should
should be re-drafted, addressing Judge
Hogan's
concerns.
Changes
would
alleviate
court's fear that
that people
people with
alleviate the court's
Hogan's concerns. Changes
drafters
treatable
depression
might
receive
the
lethal
medication.
First,
drafters
should add
add
lethal
might receive
treatable
physician-assisted
competent
individuals
only
truly
protections
to
ensure
that
competent
individuals
utilize
physician-assisted
protections
commitment of
of
suicide. Judge Hogan noted that Oregon law authorizes the civil commitment
way. 230 A treating
mentally ill persons who endanger
endanger themselves
themselves in some way.230
treating physician
mentally
Examiners would have the authority
authority to hold
licensed by the Board
Board of Medical Examiners
individuals in a health care facility until a judge appoints a qualified
qualified examiner
examiner to
231
231
require
16
evaluate the patient.
court also suggested that Measure
Measure
require that
The Lee court
"the person
person consult a certified social worker
worker or other specialist to explore
explore social
social
Supp. at
at 1437.
F. Supp.
222 See
See Lee,
222
Lee, 891
891 F.
1437.
rooted
or "deeply
"deeply rooted
liberty" or
concept of
of ordered
rights are
those "implicit
Fundamental rights
223
223 Fundamental
are those
"impl icit in
in the
the concept
ordered liberty"
(1986).
in this Nation's history and tradition."
tradition." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
limiting
that regulations
regulations limiting
(holding that
238, 248
248 (1976)
(1976) (holding
U.S. 238,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Kelley
224
224 See,
Kelley v.
v. Johnson,
Johnson, 425
425 U.S.
policemen's hair length were reasonable).
185-92.
supra text
accompanying notes
225
See supra
225 See
text accompanying
notes 185-92.
based
survive challenges
challenges based
regulations survive
that ifif state
state regulations
at 245
(noting that
425 U.S.
See, e.g.,
e.g., Kelley,
Kelley, 425
226 See,
226
U.S. at
245 (noting
on the "explicit language of the First Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive
regulations of state employees where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the
substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
L.
Dignity Act,
Death with
with Dignity
Oregon's New
New Death
Last Rights:
Rights: Oregon's
T. Graham,
Graham, Last
227
227 Kathy
Kathy T.
Act, 31
31 WILLAMETTE
WILLAMETTE L.
(1995).
REV. 601, 628 (1995).
Or. 1995).
1995).
1429, 1435-37
1435-37 (D.
891 F.
Supp. 1429,
Lee v.
v. Oregon,
Oregon, 891
228
See Lee
228 See
F. Supp.
(D. Or.
to protect
protect
that
if "Oregon
"Oregon voters
630
(arguing
note
227,
at
supra
But
see
Graham,
229
229 But see Graham, supra note 227, at 630 (arguing that if
voters want
want to
these rights, individual plaintiffs should not be allowed to subvert them").
(1995).
STAT. §§ 426.070(5)(b)(A)
also OR.
1435; see
see also
Lee, 891
891 F.
F. Supp.
230 See
See Lee,
230
Supp. at
at 1435;
OR. REV.
REV. STAT.
426.070(5)(b)(A) (1995).
physician
way aa treating
treating physician
clear in
in what
what way
not entirely
entirely clear
1434. It
It is
is not
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1434.
See Lee,
Lee, 891
891 F.
231 See
231
competency than the attending and consulting
better serves the goal of assessing a patient's 'competency
physicians under Measure 16. Presumably, the treating physician would be more familiar with the
patient's condition, and should therefore have some insight into how to judge her decision to die.
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services
comfort." 232 Although this
services which might assist the person to live in greater comfort."232
further requirement may temporarily
temporarily frustrate competent
competent individuals
individuals who have
decided
contemplating their options
decided to die, it may also help to ensure that all those contemplating
have the information necessary to make an informed choice. A mandatory
mandatory session
with a mental health professional
professional would protect
protect those that attending and consulting
consulting
physicians
otherwise incorrectly classify as competent.
physicians might otherwise
physician's duty under Measure
Another of the court's concerns focused on a physician's
233
16.233
Although
doctors
generally
must
treat
patients
with the same
same diligence and
16.
expertise
expertise as other doctors in similar circumstances, Measure 16 provides immunity
. . . with this act."234
act." 234 This could
to any physician
physician who "participates
"participates in good faith ...
could
conceivably
"negligently misdiagnose a person's condition
conceivably allow the physician to "negligently
and competency
competency and negligently
negligently prescribe
prescribe a drug overdose,
overdose, so long as those actions
actions
235
are in 'good
'good faith."'
Removing
Measure 16
faith. "'235
Removing the good faith provision would bring Measure
in line
!ine with the accepted
court's
accepted standard
standard of care,
care, and should further alleviate the court's
concern.
concern.
Perhaps the most significant
significant modification
modification suggested
suggested by the court's opinion in
Lee relates to Measure 16's lack of safeguards
safeguards at the time the patient ingests the
236 At that moment, the patient's
medication. 236
medication.
patient's decision to take the lethal medication
medication
237
must be rational and voluntary.
A
modified statute
physician's
voluntary.237
statute could require a physician's
attendance at the time the patient takes his or her life. Or it could mandate that the
attendance
patient take the medication
medication immediately
immediately on receipt of the drugs. Either way, the
modification would make the Death with Dignity
Dignity Act more sensitive to curtailing
curtailing
238
undue influence
influence by third parties. 238
The perceived
perceived inadequacies
inadequacies of Measure 16 led the Lee court
court to conclude
conclude that
"Measure 16 provides a means to commit suicide
"Measure
suicide to a severely
severely overinclusive
overinclusive class
others." 239 By
who may be competent, incompetent, unduly influenced, or abused by others."239
By
tightening those portions of the statute
statute designed to guarantee that only appropriately
trained professionals
professionals contribute
contribute to the prescription of lethal doses of medication
medication to
constitutionally
truly competent
competent persons, courts should no longer find such laws constitutionally
240
deficient. 24o
V.

CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
It might well turn
tum out that courts
courts will be more willing to uphold the
constitutionality
legislation, such as Oregon's, that partially
partially decrimconstitutionality of legislation,

232 [d.
Id. "With
death at
at issue
issue under
under Measure
the court
court is
Measure 16,
is unable
unable to
to conceive
conceive of
of aa set
232
"With death
16, the
set of
of facts
facts
under which
which it would be rational
rational to not require mental
mental and social evaluations by appropriately
appropriately
professionals." Id.
trained professionals."
ld. at 1436.
233 See
See id.
at 1436-37.
1436-37.
233
id. at
234 Death
Death with
with Dignity
Act, OR.
OR. REV.
REV. STAT.
STAT. §§ 127.885.
127.885.
234
Dignity Act,
235 Lee,
Lee, 891
891 F.
1437.
235
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1437.
236 See
See id.
236
id.
237 See
See id.
237
id.
238 See
See id.
238
id.
239 Id.
2391d.

240 The
The argument
that Measure
Measure 16
16 denies
denies terminally
terminally ill
ill patients
equal protection
protection would
240
argument that
patients equal
would
dissipate if Oregon
Oregon repealed its statute outlawing assisted suicide.
suicide. In the absence
absence of that statute,
there
there could
could be no force to the argument
argument that Measure
Measure 16 denies to terminally ill people the same
same
protection afforded to other citizens. This solution appears
of
appears unlikely due to the historical
historical support of
such
such laws.
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legislation is narrowly drafted and
inalizes assisted suicide,
suicide, if that legislation
contains
contains adequate
adequate protections, than they are to hold unconstitutional
statutes that criminalize
criminalize assisted suicide. So doing would exhibit the
statutes

kind of deference
deference to democratic
democratic values
values and to the limited role of the
decriminalization legislation
courts-especially when the partial
partial decriminalization
legislation is
courts---especially
enacted by referendum-that
courts almost reflexively
reflexively invoke when
referendum-that courts
24 1
hesitating to hold statutes unconstitutional.
unconstitutional. 241
The success or failure, both of attempts to legalize physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide
suicide
and of challenges
challenges to laws prohibiting assisted suicide, rests with the U.S.
U.S.
Constitution. Whether
Whether one may reasonably argue that a constitutionally
constitutionally protected
protected
(fundamental or otherwise), it seems
right to physician-assisted
physician-assisted suicide exists (fundamental
242
interpretation. 242
an interpretation.
to such
unlikely that the U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court would agree
agree to
such an
Although broad readings of certain judicial
judicial opinions suggest that a state's prohibition
prohibition
243
of privacy,
right of
the right
unconstitutionally interfere with
with the
privacy,243
against assisted suicide may unconstitutionally
244
the Court appears hesitant to supplant
supplant that state's judgment.
judgment. 244
Oregon, the District Court for the District
In Lee v. Oregon,
District of Oregon found that
245
Amendment. 245
the Fourteenth
Measure
Measure 16 violated
violated the Equal Protection
Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The court's
court's analysis was faulty, however,
however, and its decision should be reversed. In
fact, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Appeals itself said in no uncertain
uncertain terms that Judge
ruling. 246
"clearly erred"
Hogan
Hogan had "clearly
erred" in his "highly irregular"
irregular" equal
equal protection ruling.246
Under certain
certain circumstances,
circumstances, Measure 16 would have allowed persons
247
medication. 247
of medication.
prescribed a lethal dose'
dose' of
diagnosed with a terminal illness to be prescribed
diagnosed
Therefore,
Therefore, the terminally ill would receive different
different treatment than the remainder of
of
248
Treating one class
Oregon's
Oregon's citizens for whom assisted suicide is a felony.
felony.248
differently
remainder of the state's population
differently than the remainder
population is acceptable
acceptable if the
the
249
In this case,
classification
rationally related
related to a legitimate state interest. 249
classification drawn is rationally
other
the State of Oregon correctly argued that allowing the terminally ill, but not other

note 82,
82, at
510.
241 MEISEL,
MEISEL, supra
241
supra note
at 510.
242 See
supra Part
242
See supra
Part 11I.
III.
851
Pennsylvania v.
U.S. 833,
833, 851
Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern
Southeastern Pennsylvania
243 See,
See, e.g.,
243
e.g., Planned
Parenthood of
v. Casey,
Casey, 505
505 U.S.
(1992) (noting that the Court's precedents "have
(1992)
"have respected the private realm
realm of family life which the
state cannot enter," and that "choices
"choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
Amendment").
(stating that
497 U.S.
U.S. 261,
280 (1990)
Director, Missouri
Missouri Dep't
Dep't of
of Health,
244 See
See Cruzan
Cruzan v.
244
v. Director,
Health, 497
261, 280
(1990) (stating
that aa
informed and voluntary decision by a
state "is
"is [not] required to remain neutral in the face of an informed
physically able adult to starve to death"); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 ("Beliefs about these
were they formed under compulsion of the
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
state.").
Supp. 1429,
1429, 1437
(D. Or.
1995).
245 Lee
v. Oregon,
Oregon, 891
891 F.
F. Supp.
245
Lee v.
1437 (D.
Or. 1995).
838 nn.138-39
nn.138-39 (9th
Cir. 1996).
v. Washington,
Washington, 79
79 F.3d
246 Compassion
Compassion in
246
in Dying
Dying v.
F.3d 790,
790, 838
(9th Cir.
1996).
REV.
STAT.
§
127.805
(1995).
247
See
OR.
247 See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (1995).
248 See
See id.
id. §§ 163.125(1)(b).
163.125(1)(b).
248
that Congress
Congress could
could make
make
450 U.S.
221, 238-39
238-39 (1981)
(1981) (holding
249 See
See Schweiker
Schweiker v.
v. Wilson,
Wilson, 450
249
U.S. 221,
(holding that
funds
for
their
care
and
in
public
institutions
receiving
Medicaid
a
distinction
between
residents
a
residents in such institutions not receiving such funds); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
personal" rights or is drawn on
"fundamental personal"
(1976) (holding that unless a classification tramples on "fundamental
(1976)
on
alienage," the Court will presume the
"inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,"
"inherently
"require only that the classification challenged
constitutionality of the statutory discrimination and "require
be rationally related to aa legitimate state interest").
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citizens,
citizens, to receive
receive lethal doses of medication
medication rationally relates to its interest in,
250
among
among other things, avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering. 250
Measure 16, modifications
modifications to the Death with
Should the courts strike down Measure
Dignity Act might allow it to withstand
withstand the constitutional
constitutional scrutiny it would surely
surely
receive if passed again. The court's ruling noted problems with the determination of
of
25
whether
' A tighter
whether a person requesting the prescription was really competent.
competent.251
tighter
system which requires evaluation
evaluation by a mental health professional
professional should
should satisfy the
court's objections.
challenge to Measure 16 on the grounds that it violates
It appears
appears a challenge
violates due process
process
would fail under traditional constitutional
constitutional analysis. In light of the court's reasoning
reasoning
on the equal protection
protection issue, however, a reviewing court might find the law
unconstitutional
unconstitutional on due process grounds as well. Still, suggested modifications
modifications
which would satisfy the court's objections with respect to the equal protection
protection
violations
violations would probably suffice
suffice to eliminate
eliminate the due process
process concerns.

250
891 F.
F. Supp.
1434.
250 See
See Lee,
Lee. 891
Supp. at
at 1434.
251
See id.
id. (noting
to differentiate
differentiate between
between competent
competent and
251 See
(noting that
that the
the procedures
procedures designed
designed to
and
incompetent
incompetent persons are insufficient).
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